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The dramatic title of the conference for which this Essay was
written raises the question, what is the Constitution “in exile” from?1
The “Constitution in Exile” might refer to an entire set of doctrines
and principles purportedly banished from constitutional discourse in
the post–New Deal era. On the possible claim that this “exiled” Con-
stitution is being repatriated, there is, on the one hand, little doubt
that the Court has embarked on a revival of federalism as a judicially
enforceable constraint on national power. Working from the infre-
quently changed text of an old, written constitution, the Supreme
Court in the last decade has engaged in a substantial reworking of the
outlines of the federal and state governments’ relative constitutional
powers. The Court’s rather stark departures from an earlier, post–
World War II era federalism landscape include its implicit
abandonment of the premise of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,2 which primarily relied on the political process to
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1. The conference title, “The Constitution in Exile: Is It Time to Bring It in From the
Cold?,” was inspired by Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s book review, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delega-
tion Running Riot, REGULATION, No. 1, 1995 at 83, 84 (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION (1993)) (referring to a “Constitution-in-exile”).
2. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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protect the role of the states in the union,3 and its reinvigoration of a
categorical, line-drawing approach to defining federal power, an ap-
proach that has historically proven unstable.4 The Court has invoked
a divide between economic and noneconomic activity that does little
more than attempt to capture (and not entirely accurately)5 those ar-
eas in which Congress has hitherto exercised its Commerce Clause
power, a divide that may also significantly disable Congress from us-
ing the commerce power to protect the economy from harms gener-
ated by barriers to the full participation in the national economy by
historically disadvantaged groups.6 The Court has thereby retreated
from its earlier views that Congress has the power to protect the na-
tion’s economy from injury, whatever the source.7 Moreover, the
Court has extended states’ immunity from ordinary liability under
valid federal law, even where states are competing against private en-
3. Cf. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1333–
34 (1997) (arguing that Garcia is no longer good law with respect to judicial review of federalism
questions).
4. Compare, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (suggesting that
Congress lacks the power to regulate manufacturing because it is distinct from commerce), with
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68–69 (1911) (rejecting a constitutional argument
based on Knight, stating that “[this] view . . . [has] been so necessarily and expressly decided to
be unsound as to cause the contention to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express no-
tice”).
5. For cases upholding the application of a federal statute in the absence of commercial
activity, see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 484–86 (1917) (upholding a statute pro-
hibiting interstate transportation of women for, inter alia, “any . . . immoral purpose”); United
States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1908) (upholding a ban on the importation of alien women
for, inter alia, “any . . . immoral purpose”). Although under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559, 561 (1995), the statutes involved in these cases concerned interstate movement of persons
and thus might be constitutionally evaluated under the “instrumentalities” of commerce rather
than the “substantial effects” test, it is nonetheless worth noting that an objection to the applica-
tion of the federal statute absent commercial purposes was rejected by the Caminetti Court de-
spite being raised in a dissent. 242 U.S. at 497–98 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
6. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000) (invalidating a federal rem-
edy for victims of gender-motivated assaults). For further discussion of Morrison, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1259 (2001).
7. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that Con-
gress’s power “may be exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no matter what the source of the
dangers which threaten it’” (quoting Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912)));
Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. at 51 (upholding the implementation of an eight-hour
workday for railroad employees and rejecting an argument that would treat “the source of the
injury, rather than its effect upon interstate commerce, as the criterion of congressional
power”).
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tities,8 and has created an immunity from federal “commandeering”
of state officers unjustified by constitutional text, structure or history.9
On the other hand, and notwithstanding this revival of judicially
enforceable federalism limits on national power, the metaphor of ex-
ile obscures important continuities in the Court’s federalism jurispru-
dence over time. Exile is also too war-like a metaphor to describe the
largely peaceful processes of constitutional contest and change that
have characterized the development of constitutional law for much of
the last century. Although the Court’s recent federalism cases repre-
sent an important shift, the Constitution being elaborated these days
was never in “exile.” Rather, it was sustained in dissent throughout
most of the last sixty years. Exile and dissent are different modali-
ties.10 And dissent, unlike exile, is an important tool for the recon-
struction of constitutional law—a tool that offers some hope for the
future to those in disagreement with the Court’s current approach to
national power. In Part I, I discuss these points.
There is a second sense in which the Constitution might be
thought of as being in a kind of exile, for the Court has largely held
itself aloof from engaging with the practice of constitutional adjudica-
tion in other nations. The metaphor of “exile” might imply a self-
imposed isolation, a being “out in the cold,” and thus may accurately
capture the relationship of the United States’s constitutional law to
constitutional developments elsewhere in the world. U.S. constitu-
tional decisions, majority as well as dissenting opinions, lack a rich
tradition of engagement with the reasoned elaboration of constitu-
tional norms around the world. Justices’ opinions veer between what
we might call forms of “legally autonomous” reasoning, in which re-
sults are presented as if derived from legal texts and precedents alone,
and more “contextualized” reasoning that places legal decisions in
8. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647–48 (1999).
9. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916–25 (1997). For more discussion and cri-
tique of Printz, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2183–2213 (1998).
10. An exile is a “forced” or “voluntary absence from one’s country or home”; to exile
someone is to “banish or expel from one’s own country or home.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 406–07 (10th ed. 1999). A dissent is a “difference of opinion,” and
“to dissent” is “to withhold assent” or “to differ in opinion.” Id. at 336; see also 5 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 540–41 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that an exile is an “enforced removal from
one’s native land according to an edict or sentence” and to exile someone is to “compel [a per-
son] by decree or enactment to leave his country”); 4 id. at 837 (stating that a dissent is a “dif-
ference of opinion or sentiment,” and to dissent is to “withhold assent or consent from a pro-
posal”).
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some broader context—of history, political economy or comparative
government.11 But even when the Court has considered the constitu-
tional experiences of other nations, it almost never has engaged the
reasoning of other constitutional courts. In this respect (at least with
regard to questions of individual rights), the Court’s interpretive
methodologies are more self-contained and autonomous than those of
many other constitutional courts. In Part II, I suggest that, notwith-
standing possible objections, there are a number of benefits for U.S.
constitutional adjudication from more engagement with the relevant
constitutional experiences of other nations and their tribunals.
I go on to ask whether it may prove more difficult to learn di-
rectly from other nations’ constitutional courts’ decisions on federal-
ism than from comparative constitutional law on issues of individual
human rights. Federal systems are built on inherently political com-
promises, often quite particularly contextualized, and consist of inter-
dependent “packages” whose particular features may function quite
differently in connection with other federalism “packages.” Yet there
is much to be learned from the constitutional experiences of other na-
tions, both generally and on questions of judicial enforcement of con-
stitutional federalism. I end with a brief discussion of what we might
learn from the constitutional experiences of other federal nations that
might assist in developing more judicially manageable standards for
review of federalism challenges to national action in the United
States.
The metaphor of “exile,” then, invites two different compari-
sons—of the current Court’s constitutional interpretations compared
to those of earlier Courts in the United States, and of U.S. constitu-
tional decisions compared to those of the influential constitutional
courts of other nations. Yet as I will suggest below, there is a sense in
which the Court’s revival of judicially enforceable limits on national
power and its reluctance to invoke comparative experience may be
related. Both may result in part from a degree of institutional insecu-
rity and a related compensatory assertiveness, reflected in the con-
struction of a legal narrative that seeks to appear autonomous from
11. Paradoxically, as will appear below, in some settings appeals to transnational constitu-
tional law can be understood to reinforce and in other settings to undermine the perceived in-
tegrity and autonomy of law. See generally Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 499 (2000).
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influence by the political branches of the national government and
from the decisions of other nation’s constitutional courts.12
I.  DISSENT, NOT EXILE: THE CONSTITUTION AS A PLACE OF
CONTEST OVER FEDERALISM NARRATIVES.
The phrase “Constitution in exile” implies that there have been
“different” constitutions at different moments. To the extent that this
implication resonates with Bruce Ackerman’s argument that the Con-
stitution has actually been amended in “constitutional moments,”
such as the New Deal, through a combination of political and judicial
activity outside of Article V,13 I want to mildly resist both the descrip-
tion and the claim, at least with respect to questions of federalism.
Rather, I would suggest, beginning in the early 1990s, themes that had
resided primarily in separate or dissenting opinions in prior decades
assumed ascendancy. While it is a far stretch from the closely divided
1903 decision in the Lottery Case14 to the Court’s unanimous 1942 de-
cision in Wickard v. Filburn15 to the again closely divided 1995 deci-
sion in Lopez,16 it is in many ways recognizably the same Constitution,
and the same constitutional provisions, around which controversy re-
volves, with similar arguments being worked and reworked. The re-
ported “death” of federalism17 is in this sense quite different from the
death of legally approved racial apartheid that resulted from Brown
v. Board of Education.18
12. This Essay was originally prepared for a conference in October, 2000, well before the
election of 2000 and the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). I do not seek to integrate
that decision into the analysis presented, other than to note that the assertiveness of the Court’s
posture toward Congress noted in this Essay is not inconsistent with the Court’s failure to treat
the questions before it in Bush v. Gore as “political” questions committed to Congress by the
Constitution in Article II, Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment.
13. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 22 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 312–44 (1998).
14. 188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903) (upholding a federal prohibition on the interstate transport of
lottery tickets).
15. 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (upholding a federal regulatory scheme limiting the
amount of wheat that could be grown on a home farm for consumption on the farm).
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act as beyond congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
17. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709,
1711 (1985).
18. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “separate but equal” as applied to public educa-
tion violates the Equal Protection Clause). Although Brown did not explicitly overrule Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986), after Brown, Plessy and the constitutional rule of “separate but
equal” were not again asserted on the Court as a basis to uphold segregation or racial classifica-
tions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (“[I]t is no longer open to question
that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities.”).
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A. Federalism and Dissent
Although the Court’s unanimity in cases like Wickard and Darby
v. United States19 might be regarded as the signal of a new constitu-
tional regime, it is worth remembering that those cases were decided
in the face of a major world war, when the apparent importance of
sustaining the powers of the national government may have been
heightened by the perceived imperatives of wartime. Federalism con-
cerns about the scope of national power soon reemerged. Within a
year of the war’s end, in 1946, the Court fractured about the scope of
national power in holding that a state’s sale of mineral water could be
subject to federal taxation in New York v. United States,20 with Jus-
tices Douglas and Black in dissent. In 1948, while the Court upheld
federal rent control legislation under the war powers in Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co.,21 Justice Jackson—author of the unanimous
opinion in Wickard—concurred separately to express his concern
about expansive use of the war powers (albeit primarily out of con-
cern for individual liberties).22 In 1953, Justice Jackson’s opinion in
United States v. Five Gambling Devices,23 resting the decision on statu-
tory grounds, indicates that its interpretation was strongly influenced
by constitutional federalism concerns about the scope of federal
power to require reporting on intrastate gambling deals.24
19. 312 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1941) (upholding a federal minimum wage law). For an argument
that it was in Wickard and Darby that the Court made more radical changes in doctrine than in
the 1937 cases, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 224–25 (1998) (“[I]t was only after overcoming severe
personal doubts that even four of the Roosevelt appointees were prepared to reach the result in
Wickard. . . . [O]ne may reasonably doubt that the justices of the 1937 Court would have
reached the same conclusions had death and retirement not spared them such dilemmas.”).
20. 326 U.S. 572, 573–84 (1946) (holding that New York’s mineral water bottling operation
was not exempt from a federal sales tax).
21. 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (recognizing that “if the war power can be used in days of
peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it may not only swallow up all
other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments as well,”
but asserting that “[t]here are no such implications in today’s decision”).
22. Id. at 146 (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing “misgivings” about war powers).
23. 346 U.S. 441, 449–52 (1953) (Jackson, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (con-
struing a federal statute that required dealers in gambling devices to register with the attorney
general not to apply absent specific showing of connection to interstate commerce). Justice
Jackson’s opinion was joined only by Justices Frankfurter and Minton, id. at 442, with Justices
Black and Douglas concurring in the judgment on other grounds, id. at 452, and with four Jus-
tices in dissent supporting application of the statute to the facts before the Court, id. at 454.
24. See id. at 446–48:
No precedent of this Court sustains the power of Congress to enact legislation penal-
izing failure to report information concerning acts not shown to be in, or mingled
with, or found to affect commerce . . . . [T]his Court will construe a statute in a man-
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Ensuing decades likewise saw federalism objections to exercises
of national power expressed in dissents, concurrences, and a majority
opinion. Although the Court unanimously upheld the 1964 Civil
Rights Act’s public accommodations provisions under the Commerce
Clause,25 the validity of another provision of the 1964 Act (construed
to nullify prior convictions arising from sit-ins to protest discrimina-
tory denials of service)26 prompted two dissents, both relying in part
on federalism grounds.27 The constitutionality of the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to a limited group of state and lo-
cal government employees was upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz28 in 1968,
but only over the dissent of two Justices.29 Three years later, in United
States v. Perez,30 the Court upheld a federal loan-sharking statute as
applied to entirely intrastate transactions, but over Justice Stewart’s
dissent, which raised familiar federalism concerns about the absence
of any line dividing federal from state power in the Court’s rationale.31
National League of Cities v. Usery32 struck down the extension of the
FLSA to state employees on federalism grounds, disagreeing with the
approach of the majority in Maryland v. Wirtz, albeit over strong dis-
sents.33 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,34
Justice Rehnquist concurred separately in order to argue that only a
“substantial” effect on interstate commerce warrants federal regula-
tion of intrastate activities.35 Four years later, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,36 which reversed National League of
ner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory lan-
guage leaves no reasonable alternative.
25. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
26. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 317 (1964) (construing Title II of the Civil
Rights Act to require the vacation of sit-in convictions then pending on appeal).
27. See id. at 320 (Black, J., dissenting) (expressing “grave doubt” about the power under
the Commerce Clause to require abatement of convictions for action taken before enactment of
the federal law); id. at 325 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that evidence that past state trespass
convictions would burden present interstate commerce “would be a prerequisite to the validity
of any purported exercise of the Commerce power”).
28. 392 U.S. 183, 198–99 (1968).
29. See id. at 201 (Douglas, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act’s ex-
tension to state and local government employees was “not consistent with our constitutional
federalism”).
30. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
31. Id. at 157–58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. 452 U.S. 26 (1981).
35. Id. at 310–11 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
36. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Cities and upheld application of the FLSA to the states, evoked vig-
orous dissents on federalism grounds from four Justices.37 The idea
that federalism was “exiled” from constitutional discourse is at odds
with this record.
I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s recent federalism cases
are not significant. They are quite significant and they do represent a
change. The Court is embarked on a self-conscious effort to resurrect
what it may regard as a lost or threatened understanding of constitu-
tional first principles, and it is prepared to invalidate significant num-
bers of federal laws touching important areas of federal interest. The
Court is assertive in relying on its new federalism jurisprudence to in-
validate federal laws, not merely in areas of apparently novel “expan-
sions” of federal regulation to areas traditionally regulated by state or
local government, but also in areas that have long been within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the federal government, such as the patent laws.
These decisions, moreover, are already having an effect that extends,
on the Court, beyond the five-Justice majority in Lopez and Morri-
son.38 Yet the change, while dramatic, is not wholly outside the realm
of long-standing discourse on federalism in the United States that has
appeared, at least in dissent, for much of the nation’s history.
Looking even further back than the New Deal, much is familiar,
suggesting the enduring appeal of federalism values and themes in
U.S. constitutionalism. It is striking the degree to which the most
telling critiques of the Court’s recent decisions echo opinions of long
ago, suggesting the cyclical character of the Court’s federalism narra-
tives. Consider this dissenting voice: “The convention did not deter-
37. Id. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion was joined by the other dissent-
ers, including Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 557.
38. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). Jones held that, as a matter of statutory
law, the federal arson statute did not extend to arson of an owner-occupied residential home,
rejecting the government’s argument that the statutory requirement that the property be “used
in” commerce was met by the property’s receipt of gas from an interstate grid, its mortgage be-
ing held by an out-of-state company, and its insurance coverage by an out-of-state insurance
company. Id. at 855–57. The Court relied strongly on the principle of construing the statute to
avoid constitutional doubts, which the Court said were raised by Lopez, concerning the consti-
tutionality of applying the statute to arson of a private home. Id. at 857–59. Jones was written by
Justice Ginsburg and represented the unanimous views of the Court. Id. at 850. It is unlikely
that such an opinion would have been written, much less have been unanimous, prior to Lopez
and Morrison. At the same time, it also appears that the Court has shown no consistent trend in
its preemption cases of contracting the scope of federal vis-à-vis state authority, as Professor
Tushnet discusses in a recent essay on federalization and globalization. See Mark Tushnet,
Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 12–14, 24–26 (2000)
(discussing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
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mine how interstate commerce should be regulated, but rather who
should regulate it,” leaving “the necessity, extent and nature of the
regulation to the contemporaneous knowledge, wisdom and discre-
tion of the body in whom the power was vested.”39 This voice is not
from the dissents in Morrison, Alden, Seminole Tribe, or Lopez—
which sound similar themes40—but from Justice Moody’s 1907 dissent
in the first Employers’ Liability case,41 resisting the majority’s
conclusion that the Commerce Clause did not support a federal Act
because the Act failed to distinguish between railroad workers
engaged in interstate and intrastate activities.42
To take another example, the Court in Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank43 held
that Congress lacked power to provide for suits against states for pat-
ent infringement in federal courts because, even if patents are prop-
erty of which a person might be deprived through state infringements,
it could not be assumed that the states would fail to provide proper
remedies in their own courts; thus, there was no basis for thinking
that the mere presence of an infringement would rise to the level of a
due process violation.44 Consider in this regard Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases:45 “The theory of the . . . major-
ity . . . is, that the general government cannot, in advance of hostile
State laws or hostile State proceedings, actively interfere for the pro-
tection of any of the rights, privileges and immunities secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment,”46 a theory he proceeded to attack as giving
39. Employers’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 520 (1907) (Moody, J., dissenting).
40. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce is “not an issue for courts in
the first instance, but for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence and
taking testimony far exceeds ours”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“The resemblance of today’s state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era’s industrial
due process is striking.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165–69 (1996) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (comparing the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe to the Court’s effort in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), to treat common law background as constitutionally required);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603–05 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing for defer-
ence to rational legislative judgment).
41. 207 U.S. at 504 (Moody, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 508–09.
43. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
44. Id. at 643–44.
45. 109 U.S. 3, 24–26 (1883) (holding unconstitutional provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 prohibiting racial discrimination in certain public accommodations).
46. Id. at 44–45 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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no meaning to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which em-
powers Congress to enforce the rights set forth in Section 1.47
The same point can be made from another perspective: the con-
cerns of today’s majorities echo the concerns of yesteryear’s dissents.
Thus, the dissenting Justices in Ex parte Virginia48 predicted the de-
mise of the federal system from the majority’s decision to uphold the
constitutionality of a federal criminal statute applied to convict a state
court judge of failing to call any but white persons to serve as jurors.49
The dissenters argued that “[n]othing . . . could have a greater ten-
dency to destroy the independence and autonomy of the States” than
to uphold Congress’s “exercise [of] coercive authority over judicial
officers of the States in the discharge of their duties under State
laws,” a doctrine that would lead toward consolidation of a “similar
coercive authority over governors and legislators of the States.”50
Similarly, the four dissenting Justices in the Lottery Case51 argued that
An invitation to dine, or to take a drive, or a note of introduction, all
become articles of commerce under the ruling in this case . . . . This
in effect breaks down all the differences between that which is, and
that which is not, an article of commerce, and the necessary conse-
quence is to take from the States all jurisdiction over the subject so
far as interstate communication is concerned. It is a long step in the
direction of wiping out all traces of state lines . . . .52
State lines have survived, despite the Lottery Case, but the concerns
of those dissenters resonate in today’s majority’s explanations of their
decisions.53
47. Id. at 44–47. Justice Harlan went on to emphasize the importance of Section 5 as a
power in Congress additional to the prohibitions of Section 1, rejecting the majority’s analogy to
the nonimpairments of the Contracts Clause. Id. at 45 (“[A] prohibition upon a state is not a
power in Congress or in the national government.”).
48. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
49. Id. at 348–49.
50. Id. at 358–59 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 362 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Congress cannot “prescribe the duties of the state legislature and the rules it should follow . . .
for the independence of the legislature is essential to the independence and autonomy of the
State,” and that Congress cannot “lay down rules for . . . the State judiciary” because “the inde-
pendence of a State consists in the independence of its legislative, executive, and judicial offi-
cers, through whom alone it acts”).
51. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
52. Id. at 371 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
53. For examples of recent scholarship devoted to establishing the judicial enforceability of
federalism-based limits on national power, identifying a judicially enforceable division of federal
from state power, or explicating the “original” meaning of the Commerce Clause, see Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to
Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA
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One final example of an older dissent with contemporary echoes,
especially in the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Morrison,54
is found in Justice Holmes’s opinion in the Northern Securities case.55
Disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of a statute in part on
the ground that it raised constitutional doubts, Holmes explained,
“Commerce depends upon population, but Congress could not, on
that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce.”56 Holmes
argued that if the government’s logic were carried forward, he could
“see no part of the conduct of life with which on similar principles
Congress might not interfere.”57 The oral argument in Lopez, and
again in Morrison, reads like an echo of this Holmes’s dissent,58 as
does the majority’s insistence that there must be something that Con-
gress cannot regulate under its commerce power.59
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing new in the Court’s
federalism cases, but only that much of what one sees there is the re-
vival of a longstanding interpretive tradition in American constitu-
tional law—with, of course, its own distinctive features as discussed
below.
B. Judicial Anxiety and Institutional Competition
I focus here on five characteristics of the Court’s recent case law
on federalism as a constraint on national power. First, today’s cases
insist on the separation of the “local” from the “truly national” and
on the need for a separate sphere of state authority, an area in which
state legislative authority is exclusive. Invocation of “separate
spheres” of dual sovereignty was a familiar feature of nineteenth cen-
L. REV. 1 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 101 (2001).
54. 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (invalidating the federal remedy for victims of gender-
motivated assaults).
55. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–11 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 402.
57. Id. at 402–03.
58. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Lopez, (No. 93-1260), 1994
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 107, at *4 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“What is there that Congress could not do, under
this rubric, if you are correct?”); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Morrison, (No.
99-5), 2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 22, at *8, (Jan. 11, 2000) (“[U]nder your theory . . . . if there’s
bias against women and they’re not receiving adequate alimony . . . then it would also have an
effect on commerce. Would it not?”); id. at *16 (“[Y]our approach . . . would justify . . . a Fed-
eral remedy for alimony or child support . . . .”).
59. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (noting that the Constitution requires a distinction be-
tween what is “truly local” and “truly national”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68
(1995) (same).
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tury cases—both as to Congress’s powers and as to implied restric-
tions on state powers.60 The assertion that certain areas are reserved
exclusively to the states is not new. What is new is the modern sensi-
bility that accompanies the assertion. As some Justices in the current
majority acknowledge, there are plausible readings of the scope of na-
tional power under the Commerce Clause that would render almost
all state powers concurrent, rather than exclusive, since the economy
has expanded to the point where all economic activity can be seen as
interconnected, and “noneconomic” activity is understood to have
significant effects on the operation of that economy.61 While older
cases anticipated this logic,62 Justice O’Connor’s acknowledgment that
the nation’s economy has changed63 makes more palpable the strain in
the effort to reassert older divisions.64 The line that is being defended
has moved from the line earlier generations defended,65 but the as-
serted need to draw a categorical line is a familiar move.
60. See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 405–06, 410 (1871) (“And the powers of
the General government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same
territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently
of each other, within their respective spheres.”).
61. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583–84 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because virtually every state activity, like virtually every activity of
a private individual, arguably ‘affects’ interstate commerce, Congress can now supplant the
States from the significant sphere of activities envisioned for them by the Framers.”).
62. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402–03 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing); cf. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 53, at 76 n.345 (observing that Chief Justice Fuller’s dis-
sent in the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), warned that the Court’s opinion transformed non-
commercial items into commercial items based only on their transportation from one state to
another with potentially large effects on the scope of national power).
63. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., dissenting):
Just as surely as the Framers envisioned a National Government capable of solving
national problems, they also envisioned a republic whose vitality was assured by the
diffusion of power not only among the branches of the Federal Government but also
between the Federal Government and the States . . . . In the 18th century these inten-
tions did not conflict because technology had not yet converted every local problem
into a national one. A conflict has now emerged . . . .
64. Some see this as a faithful act of translation. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 129–31. Absent a constitutional
principle limiting the scope of federal power to preempt state laws even in areas of concurrent
legislative authority, the impulse to identify areas in which states can preserve their legislative
authority is perhaps an arguable inference from the clear constitutional requirement that states
have legislatures. Cf. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 795, 798–99 (1996) (suggesting that the scope of the federal power to preempt should not
necessarily be as great as the federal power to legislate).
65. Compare N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 397 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing against federal
power to prohibit a merger and acquisition because Congress has no power to control owner-
ship of property and suggesting that, if the logic of the majority were upheld, and “[i]f it were
judged by Congress that the farmer in sowing his crops should be limited to a certain production
because overproduction would give power to affect commerce, Congress could regulate that
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Second we see the assertion of a purportedly clear founding vi-
sion, a vision in which the emphasis is less on the supremacy of fed-
eral law and more on maintaining a balance of powers between the
states and the national government. Thus, in Gregory v. Ashcroft66 the
Court asserts that it is important to maintain a “proper balance” be-
tween federal and state power.67 In Lopez, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O’Connor, insists that “the federal balance” requires that the
Court be prepared to “intervene when one or the other level of Gov-
ernment has tipped the scales too far.”68 Perhaps most dramatically,
the idea of balance is invoked in Alden.69 In explaining why the Con-
stitution immunizes states from lawsuits in their own courts for dam-
ages for violations of federal law, the Court seems to suggest that
states themselves must be allowed to balance “competing interests”—
including federal obligations—in a process of deliberation within the
state.70 Not only must there generally be a “balance,” then, but even
in the sphere of valid federal legislation, federalism requires further
consideration on the “state” side of the balance when it comes to en-
forcing federal law.
This emphasis on balance rather than supremacy is to a surpris-
ing degree a modern innovation, perhaps one safely available only
once two developments occurred: first, that the supremacy of federal
law is regarded as safely secured, and second, that large areas of con-
current jurisdiction have been accepted not only as a fact of life but
also as a fact of law. Yet if the goal is to sustain a new federal balance,
this task will be difficult to achieve in specific litigation about par-
ticular issues of legislative jurisdiction, since the “balance” in a fed-
subject”), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (upholding federal regulations
limiting agricultural production). Justice White’s use of the farming example in 1904 presumably
was intended to offer an example that would feel “over the line” to his generation; but in 1942
the line had clearly moved, and in their concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
573–74 (1995), Justices Kennedy and O’Connor indicated their intention not to disturb Wickard.
66. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
67. Id. at 459 (upholding a state law requiring state judges to retire at age seventy).
68. 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
70. See id. at 750–51 (1999):
A general federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would place
unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will of their
citizens . . . . While the judgment creditor of a State may have a legitimate claim for
compensation, other important needs and worthwhile ends compete for access to the
public fisc. . . . If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the
States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation by
the political process established by the citizens of the State not by judicial decree
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.
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eral system is the product of an interrelated set of features only one
of which is the allocation of legislative authority.71
A third feature of the recent cases is the Court’s display of a self-
conscious willingness to assert rules not derived from the Constitu-
tion’s text to constrain the exercise of national power.72 The develop-
ment and articulation of concrete rules, implied from the Constitu-
tion’s general structure, rather than its text, as limits on national
power have a long history. Perhaps the most striking forebear of to-
day’s nontextual “anticommandeering” rule or “Eleventh Amend-
ment” rules that ignore the limited text of the Amendment, would be
the intergovernmental tax immunities that at one time, for example,
precluded the federal or state governments from imposing taxes on
the income of a person employed by the other level of government,73
and which continue in far more limited form today.74 The nineteenth-
century Court that found an immunity from federal taxation for state
officers insisted on the necessity of the rule for the preservation of the
states in the federal union with no less force or passion than the cur-
rent majority evinces in support of the anticommandeering rule. Yet
the nineteenth-century holding in Collector v. Day was overruled in
Graves v. O’Keefe,75 and Pollock’s holding on the taxability of interest
on public obligations was overruled in South Carolina v. Baker,76 and
the states still stand. This is not to say that nontextual, structural rules
are unnecessary or wrong, but it does support some degree of skepti-
cism about claims that states need categorical judge-made rules to
71. See infra notes 207–12 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 728–29 (recognizing a constitutional immunity for states
from suit in their own courts on obligations incurred under a valid federal statute and specifi-
cally recognizing that the immunity is not textual but derived from “postulates” understood to
be implicit in the Constitution); Printz v. New York, 521 U.S. 898, 933–34 (1997) (recognizing a
constitutional immunity for state and local executive officers from being “commandeered” by
federal law); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (recognizing an immunity for
states from suit in federal court by the state’s own citizens on federal claims). For discussion of
the Court’s willingness to rely on structural reasoning to identify nontextual immunities, see
generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1601 (2001); Jackson, supra note 6.
73. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 128 (1870) (holding a state official immune
from federal income tax); Dobbins v. Comm’rs of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435, 450 (1842)
(holding a federal employee immune from county taxes); see also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586, modified, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (holding, inter alia, that the
Constitution precludes federal taxation of interest earned on state-issued bonds).
74. See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 436 (1999) (holding that intergov-
ernmental tax immunity does not protect federal judges from a county’s nondiscriminatory oc-
cupational tax).
75. 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939).
76. 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
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protect them from a legislative body in which their constituents also
are represented.
Fourth, today’s federalism opinions evidence a fairly marked dis-
respect for congressional action.77 In Florida Prepaid, the Court im-
pliedly criticized Congress for acting on a record that showed only a
small number of infringement suits against states, apparently implying
that Congress should have waited for a problem of more national
scope to emerge.78 The Court also declined to consider whether Con-
gress’s abrogation of states’ immunity could be sustained on the the-
ory that an uncompensated infringement was a “taking” for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because Congress’s failure explicitly
to rely on this theory “precludes consideration” of it as a basis to up-
hold the Act79—as if Congress were a plaintiff who failed to plead the
right cause of action within the limitations period. In Lopez, the
Court commented, with thinly veiled sarcasm, that the law in question
contained no findings that might illuminate connections to commerce
not visible to “the naked eye.”80
This recent mistrust of Congress may be compared to concerns
expressed in earlier cases. In the Trade-Mark Cases,81 for example, the
Court invalidated a federal trademark law that was not by its terms
limited to transactions in interstate commerce but extended to “all
commerce.”82 Rejecting the argument that the law should be upheld
as a useful regulation of items designed for interstate commerce, the
Court wrote,
77. For more discussion, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress As The
Audience?, 574 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (2001); Neal Devins, Congress as Cul-
prit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 437,
461–62 (2001) (arguing that the Court views Congress as engaged in sloppy and often merely
symbolic acts of legislation).
78. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640
(1999) (“Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting Congress in the vot-
ing rights cases . . . Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the
States.”). The Court’s language here is reminiscent of litigation, with Congress as the party with
the burden of production.
79. Id. at 642 n.7. Controversy over whether the Court should search the Constitution for a
basis on which to uphold challenged legislation, where Congress did not make clear the powers
it sought to invoke, has a long history. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 60 (1882)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for invalidating the statute in its entirety even
though one of the cases involved passengers on an interstate train and thus might have been up-
held under the Commerce Clause and inquiring, “Has it ever been held that the judiciary should
overturn a statute because the legislative department did not accurately recite therein the par-
ticular provision of the Constitution authorizing its enactment?”).
80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
81. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
82. Id. at 99.
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When . . . Congress undertakes to enact a law, which can only be
valid as a regulation of commerce, it is reasonable to expect to find
on the face of the law, or from its essential nature, that it is a regula-
tion of commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States,
or with the Indian tribes.83
The statute not being so limited on its face,84 with “no hint that the
goods are to be transported from one State to another or between the
United States and foreign countries,” was invalid.85 Consider, as an-
other example, Justice Day’s dissent in Wilson v. New.86 Objecting to
the Court’s upholding of an eight-hour work limit and pay protections
for railroad workers, intended as temporary measures pending fur-
ther study by a commission, Justice Day argued that any presumption
of constitutionality must be based on the presupposition of sufficient
knowledge to warrant the action taken, but that by the creation of the
commission “Congress has in this act itself declared the lack of the
requisite information for definite action, and has directed an experi-
ment, . . . the expense of which is to be borne entirely by the car-
rier.”87
As this language suggests, judicial mistrust of Congress may be in
part a reflection of the tendency to find what is familiar more accept-
able than what is novel. Two recurrent, competing approaches have
been deployed in response to novel congressional assertions of power.
Justices, both earlier in the last century and within the last ten years,
have argued that the previous absence of legislation of a certain char-
acter is evidence that such legislation was not within the permissible
bounds of the Constitution.88 Other Justices, often invoking McCul-
loch v. Maryland,89 have argued that the Constitution establishes
broad congressional powers to allow the national government to meet
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id. at 97 (“We find no recognition of this principle in the chapter on trade-
marks . . . .”).
85. Id. at 96–97.
86. 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
87. Id. at 370 (Day, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S 898, 905–18 (1997) (suggesting that the ab-
sence of commandeering statutes in the past supports the claim that they are unconstitutional);
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 378 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact that no law
fixing railroad workers’ pay had been previously proposed “is the strongest evidence that in the
judgment of executives and legislators, state and national measures of this sort were not within
the bounds of permissible regulation of commerce”).
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 325–26 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal law
creating the national bank).
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the changing needs of a growing country.90 These “couplets” might be
taken to reflect enduring debates between the idea that a written con-
stitution is intended to be rigid and constraining, on the one hand,
and that a good constitution is intended to be flexible and empower-
ing, on the other. Yet the current Court’s suspicion of what is novel
seems to carry with it a note of disrespect for Congress, as well as for
the novel legislation it enacts.91
Fifth, there is today an apprehensive assertiveness about the
Court’s authority. Unlike in the early part of the twentieth century,
when members of the Court may be seen as defending a concept of
liberty focused on existing distributions of entitlements under assault
from state as well as federal legislation, today’s Court seems particu-
larly concerned with Congress as a threat to its own status in the con-
stitutional order. Although the Court was in repeated confrontations
over national legislation during the first part of the New Deal, the
tone of disagreement was addressed to the legislative product. In
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,92 for instance, the opinion opens with the
following statement:
The purposes of the “Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935” . . . are to stabilize the bituminous coal-mining industry and
promote its interstate commerce; to provide for cooperative mar-
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624–25 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that upholding the law in question would not expand the Commerce Clause but simply
apply it to “changing economic circumstances,” permitting Congress “‘to act in terms of eco-
nomic . . . realities’” in ways commensurate with the nation’s needs) (citations omitted); Em-
ployers’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 521–22 (1907) (Moody, J., dissenting) (rejecting the argu-
ment that the fact that Congress had never before enacted similar legislation was of controlling
significance on the question of its constitutional power to do so in the future). Justice Moody
wrote that
[t]he fundamental fallacy of this argument is that it misunderstands the nature of the
Constitution, undervalues its usefulness, and forgets that its unchanging provisions
are adaptable to the infinite variety of the changing conditions of our National life.
Surely there is no statute of limitations which bars Congress from the exercise of any
of its granted powers . . . .
Id. Moody goes on to say that although “the exercise of a power for the first time may be called
upon to justify itself,” history shows that “the daily needs of the factory and the household are
no longer dependent upon the resources of the locality, but are largely supplied by the products
of other States,” and thus Congress has power to regulate safety on instruments in interstate
commerce. Id. at 522–23.
91. Is it too speculative to wonder, in light of the Court’s assertion of new doctrine in sev-
eral areas of federalism, whether Congress has become, in the Court’s eyes, like those southern
jurisdictions that in the 1960s prosecuted members of the civil rights movement—its motives
suspect, its actions subject to close scrutiny and inspiring the Court to innovate in a variety of
doctrinal areas to constrain what it sees as overreaching.
92. 298 U.S. 238, 286–317 (1936) (holding that the commerce power does not authorize
congressional legislation regulating the production of coal).
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keting of bituminous coal; to levy a tax on such coal and provide for
a drawback under certain conditions; to declare the production, dis-
tribution, and use of such coal to be affected with a national public
interest; to conserve the national resources of such coal; to provide
for the general welfare, and for other purposes. . . . The constitu-
tional validity of the act is challenged in each of the suits.93
The Court’s focus here is on the Act, not Congress.
By way of contrast, consider the opening paragraph of United
States v. Morrison, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist described the
Fourth Circuit’s conclusion “that Congress lacked constitutional
authority to enact the section’s civil remedy”94—not “whether the
statute’s civil remedy is constitutional,” but rather a focus on Con-
gress acting without authority. Similarly, Justice Kennedy opened
City of Boerne v. Flores95 with the sentence, “The case calls into ques-
tion the authority of Congress to enact [the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA)],”96—not “the constitutionality of RFRA.” Al-
though it might be suggested that this is simply a general change in
style that is the product of new contemporary usages, I am skeptical:
note the different tone taken when the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a state law in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.97
Coupled with the subtle use of language to disparage its competi-
tor branch, the Court’s self-referential posture suggests insecurity
about its position and place in the constitutional scheme, and a con-
sequent attempt to assert itself. Consider the Court’s reference in Al-
den to its own “authoritative interpretations” as the basis for invali-
dating federal legislation.98 With whom is the Court arguing about
whether its interpretations are authoritative? In City of Boerne, the
Court finds Congress guilty not only of violating federalism rules, but
also of violating separation of powers principles by disagreeing with
the implications of the Court’s earlier decision in Employment Divi-
93. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
94. 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (emphasis added).
95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as an im-
permissible use of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
96. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
97. 514 U.S. 779, 783, 787 (1995) (framing the issue in terms of the constitutionality of the
act, and not in terms of the authority of the voters to enact such a measure).
98. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“Rather, as the Constitution’s structure,
its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity
from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . .”).
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sion v. Smith.99 The Court invokes Marbury to explain that “[w]hen
the political branches act against the background of a judicial inter-
pretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that . . . the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles.”100 Clearly the implication is that the Court is
not getting the respect that it deserves and that it plans to insist upon.
The federalism cases thus reveal both striking continuities and
marked new notes in the ongoing constitutional dialogue about fed-
eralism. There is a new touch of self-awareness, a consciousness of in-
terpretive choices, as well as a disrespect for Congress, immanent in
the current Court’s opinions. Interpretive choices are more naked.
Rather than contributing to judicial humility about its interpretive
choices, however, this postmodern consciousness seems to have made
the Court more assertive, as if it does not quite know what to do with
its awareness of the necessary ambiguities of the choices upon which
its jurisprudence depends.
C. Dissent, Not Exile, In Constitutional Contests
The word “exile” not only fails to recognize the continued pres-
ence of federalism concerns in the post-1937 period, but the phrase
“Constitution in exile” also has an “us against them” quality that I
want to resist. Rather than speaking of different constitutions, or of a
“Constitution in exile,” one could say that there are multiple interpre-
tive traditions that have vied with each other in different periods of
constitutional history, that should be recognized as part of an organic
and continuing constitution over which we can and should wrestle.101
In the last one hundred years, the time periods without significant dis-
sents raising competing traditions of federalism have been brief. The
principal concerns of the Lopez and Morrison majorities are reflected
in earlier majority and dissenting opinions of the pre-1937 Court. And
99. 494 U.S. 872, 878–89 (1990).
100. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537.
101. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 191–92
(1999) (envisioning constitutional law “as a populist narrative that can be retold,” under which
people today are not bound by past decisions but “have an obligation to take those decisions
seriously because they were decisions that we ourselves made, in an important—albeit con-
structed—sense”). While I do not go so far as Professor Tushnet in rejecting the binding nature
of judicial decisions (or the value of judicial review), I am in sympathy with his argument that
contradictory aspects of the narratives of American constitutional traditions (including the
Declaration of Independence) should be taken seriously and engaged meaningfully. For a re-
lated view, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 578–82
(1993) (arguing that the process of constitutional interpretation is a dynamic national dialogue
involving all of society and the three branches of government).
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so, too, can the principal critiques of these recent decisions be found
in opinions from this earlier time.102 Different federalism narratives
have cycled from majorities to dissents and back over time. While
there is certainly a revival of federalism as a substantive limit on na-
tional power today, and although I believe that many of the recent
decisions are wrongheaded, I do not believe that they are wholly out-
side the traditions of U.S. constitutional discourse, and I regard the
cycling aspects of U.S. federalism as some ground for hope that the
adverse impacts of these recent decisions will be short-lived.
It is conventional to envision constitutional decisions as “final,”
and in many areas the Court’s decisions do “finally” decide an issue.103
But constitutional law also has provided a place of contest over com-
102. Not only were different themes raised in dissents, but the majority opinions were not of
one piece on issues relating to the scope of the federal commerce power. For example, the ex-
pansive logic of United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895), is significantly disavowed
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68–69 (1911). Compare also Employers’ Liab.
Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1907) (holding unconstitutional a law regulating employment condi-
tions of employees of carriers because the statute was not limited to employees engaged in in-
terstate commerce), with Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 618 (1911) (upholding hours
regulations as applied to employees engaged in interstate commerce against the company’s ob-
jections that its employees’ activities were so intermingled as to be indistinguishable, and con-
cluding that the power of Congress to regulate entities involved in interstate commerce is not
defeated by the fact that the entities regulated may be engaged in intrastate commerce as well),
and Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912) (upholding the application of the
statute to cases in which an employee not involved in interstate commerce injured another em-
ployee who was so involved, holding that it is the effect on interstate commerce, rather than the
source of the injury, that serves as the criterion of congressional power). For a review of the his-
torical literature on the case law between the Civil War and the New Deal, and an analysis of
the incremental character of the adjudicatory and lawyering processes that led to the 1937 New
Deal cases, see CUSHMAN, supra note 19, at 141–76 (emphasizing the “current of commerce”
cases and the change in the public/private distinction in due process in Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934)).
103. This is the conventional but by no means uncontroversial understanding. For a sam-
pling of the literature, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 263–64 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Constitu-
tional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One
for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent
Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Friedman, supra note 101,
at 653–82; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judg-
ments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993); Geoffrey Miller, The President’s Power of Interpreta-
tion: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35
(Autumn 1993); Edwin Meese III, Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Deci-
sion: The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). For an impor-
tant response to challenges to judicial finality in constitutional interpretation, see Larry Alexan-
der & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1359, 1382–83 (1997). See also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Su-
premacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMM. 455 (2000) (describing and responding to several critiques
of their first article).
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peting narratives of federalism for much of the Court’s history.104 It is
a feature of successfully enduring constitutional systems to provide
opportunities for peaceful contests over what fundamental commit-
ments will be expressed in law, what fundamental commitments will
constrain lawmaking that is subordinate to the constitution. Constitu-
tional adjudication can play that role.105 To the extent it does not “fi-
nally” settle an issue for a polity, constitutional adjudication can pro-
vide a meaningful place of contest only if “losers” accept in some
sense the legitimacy of their loss.106 Losers are more likely to accept
their loss as legitimate if they have prospects for success in the future
on the same or related issues, or on other issues, or both.107 And judi-
cial dissent implies the possibility of change in the future.
A review of the Court’s case law in the roughly fifty years be-
tween the 1870s and 1920s demonstrates the force and importance of
dissenting views. In many of the cases that came to be regarded as
grave constitutional mistakes—for example, Hammer v. Dagenhart,108
Lochner v. New York,109 and the unmitigated ugliness of Plessy v.
Ferguson110—the dominant view is tempered by the presence of force-
fully argued dissents. In the Slaughter-House Cases111 in 1873 there
104. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,
1151–64 (1988) (identifying competing narratives of “nationalist” and “federalist” perspectives
on allocations of judicial power).
105. Whether it plays that role by allowing more space for legislative (and/or executive) de-
cision or by constraining that space is a matter of serious dispute. For one approach to the role
of constitutional adjudication in areas of deep contest, see Cass Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 8 (1996) (suggesting that in areas of “high complexity
about which people feel deeply and on which the nation is in flux,” decisional minimalism is ap-
propriate to prevent incorrect or ineffective judicial decisions and to allow the democratic proc-
ess to deliberate on important issues). But even without decisional minimalism, the tradition of
judicial dissent can help sustain constitutional adjudication—and, to some extent, political de-
liberation—as a space for contest.
106. For a theory of constitutional interpretation proceeding from the premise that a just
constitution is one under which losers are willing to accept their losses, see generally LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2001).
107. Cf. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH
AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 7–8 (2000) (arguing that “constitutional indeterminacy
plays a pivotal role in integrating competing forces” in the process of state reconstruction, and
that “[i]t is law’s very indeterminacy, along with its contradictory yet corresponding capacity to
set boundaries on the range of viable political options or responses, that characterizes the rela-
tionship between law and politics”).
108. 247 U.S. 251, 271 (1918) (invalidating a federal prohibition on interstate commerce in
goods produced by child labor).
109. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating a state law setting maximum hours for bakery
workers).
110. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111. 83 U.S. 36, 55–56 (1873) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state-
conferred monopoly).
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were strong dissents112 (which continued to be remarked upon within
the Court at least through the 1908 Twining v. New Jersey decision).113
In the Civil Rights Cases114 in 1883 and in Plessy in 1896 there was Jus-
tice Harlan115 (who alone is a strong dissent). But not a single sitting
Justice issued a strong dissent on the Fourteenth Amendment issue in
Morrison, and Justice Breyer’s brief effort to grapple with that issue
was joined by only one other member of the Court.116 For those who
believe that the Court’s current federalism cases are largely coming
down wrongly, in a way inconsistent with better views of U.S. feder-
alism, the absence of a forceful dissent arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to enact the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison was a troubling
disappointment.117 This is particularly so because the equality and lib-
erty norms of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are likely to
remain central to the work of the courts in the twenty-first century.
Federalism is and long has been a place of contest in U.S. consti-
tutional law, a place for which “exile” is an inapt metaphor, but a
place in which dissent has been, and is likely to remain, central to the
Court’s ability to develop better answers to new versions of enduring
questions about the relationships between the constitutional govern-
ments of the United States.
112. Id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at 124–30
(Swayne, J., dissenting).
113. 211 U.S. 78, 93–96 (1908) (noting the dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases
and the continued criticism of that decision). The dissents continue to be of importance in
scholarly work on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom,
Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE
L.J. 643, 656–57, 662–65 (2000).
114. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
115. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
116. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 664–66 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing,
without “answer[ing] the § 5 question,” that older cases do not preclude a remedy against pri-
vate actors for Fourteenth Amendment violations). Although three other justices joined Part
I.A of Breyer’s dissent (on the Commerce Clause), only Justice Stevens joined in the Four-
teenth Amendment discussion. See id. at 655.
117. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimi-
nation Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 442 (2000) (criticizing the ab-
sence of vigorous dissent on the Section 5 holding).
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II.  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE AND THE
AUTONOMY OF THE COURT’S DISCOURSE
In addition to those distinctive features noted above, another
striking aspect of the current federalism cases is the Court’s assertion
that it develops the law with virtual autonomy from other government
actors, supported by invocation of its own “first principles.” The mes-
sage in City of Boerne v. Flores plainly is, do not expect the Court to
change its views in response to what legislators do—what matters is
the Court’s own precedent.118 This assertion of judicial autonomy
finds echoes in the resistance of some members of the Court to the
relevance of comparative constitutional experience for U.S. constitu-
tional decisionmaking.
In his Printz dissent, Justice Breyer argued that European ver-
sions of federalism were relevant to the question of whether federal
law could impose duties on state officers, a question Breyer saw as
open under specific constitutional text and past decisions of the
Court. Specifically, Breyer argued, the comparative experience of
other federal polities—including Switzerland, Germany, and the
European Union, which not only permit but generally require that
most central government laws be implemented only by officials of the
constituent member entities—suggested that requiring state officials
to administer federal law was not inconsistent with a healthy federal-
ism.119 Justice Scalia, by contrast, argued that comparative practice
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting the invocation of the Court’s prece-
dents in City of Boerne and “the respect due them” under stare decisis principles); see also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (referring to the Court’s prior precedents as
“most conclusively” controlling).
119. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
[T]he United States is not the only nation that seeks to reconcile the practical need
for a central authority with the democratic virtues of more local control. At least
some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local control is
better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the
principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal sys-
tems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide
that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of
the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central “federal” body. . . . They
do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with
the independent authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary gov-
ernment, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well. . . . Of course, we are inter-
preting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant
political and structural differences between their systems and our own. . . . But their
experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
solutions to a common legal problem . . . . And that experience here offers empirical
confirmation [that] . . . . there is no need to interpret the Constitution as containing an
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was of relevance in making, but not in interpreting, constitutions.120
Elsewhere as well, Justice Scalia has sought to develop a constrained
view of when, if ever, comparative constitutional practice is relevant
to U.S. constitutional interpretation.121
These two assertions of autonomy—autonomy from Congress’s
views of the scope of national power and autonomy from the views
and practices of other constitutional systems—are linked.122 Together,
they help constitute an autonomous narrative of federalism, a narra-
tive that has assumed special prominence in recent years. Recall Jus-
tice Kennedy’s invocation of America’s unique contribution to consti-
tutionalism: “Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.”123 Lopez,
Alden, and Printz all issue calls for a return to first principles, either
expressly or by implication.124 This invocation of first principles sug-
gests that what has occurred in the years since those principles were
first laid down, here or elsewhere, is of little or no bearing. The judi-
cial narrative of U.S. federalism’s autonomy is neither new, nor is it
the only narrative of federalism on the Court, but it is an important
one today.
As I will show below in Section A, members of the Court have
episodically referred to other nations’ constitutional experiences in
absolute principle forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any state
official.
120. Id. at 921 n.11.
121. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other na-
tions, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution.”); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–
70 & n.1 (1989) (emphasizing “that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive”).
122. These assertions of independence also may be linked to the Court’s notable failures to
interpret U.S. law or treaties in light of international law. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371, 378–79 (1998) (denying habeas relief to a prisoner who asserted a claim under the Vienna
Convention); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (upholding federal
jurisdiction over a person abducted from Mexico by U.S. government agents assertedly in viola-
tion of a treaty). For a discussion of U.S. courts’ resistance to using international law in domestic
adjudication, see Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46
ME. L. REV. 211, 218 (1994); Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 4, 8–15 (1995). In resisting congressional judgments, comparative constitu-
tional experience, and international law as sources of American constitutional interpretation,
the Court resists input from beyond the scope of its own past decisions and asserts institutional
control over what counts as authority. For competing arguments that a court can advance its
own autonomy through dialogue with and use of foreign court decisions, see infra note 158.
123. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first principles.”);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999) (describing the basic principles of the federal sys-
tem); Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (describing the principles under which the Articles of Confed-
eration were replaced by the Constitution of 1787).
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resolving interpretive questions. Unlike the use of comparative expe-
rience in other nations’ constitutional courts, however, references to
foreign constitutional experience in the U.S. Reports rarely concern
the reasoning of other constitutional courts.125 It is possible that this
will change. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s disclaimer in Printz, sev-
eral sitting Justices (including Justice Scalia) have referred to the con-
stitutional experience of other nations. In Sections B and C below, I
consider some benefits of this practice and then address some con-
cerns about reliance on other nations’ constitutional experience. In
Sections D and E, I note possible limitations on the use of compara-
tive constitutional experience on federalism issues and briefly con-
sider the possible bearing of comparative constitutional federalism for
U.S. doctrine.
A. Foreign Constitutional Experience in the United States Supreme
Court
Early references to the constitutional practices of other nations
reveal a set of recurring polarities between, on the one hand, resort to
the practices of other “civilized” nations (especially when they sup-
port a governmental practice that is being attacked)126 and, on the
other hand, assertions of American exceptionalism and uniqueness as
a badge of constitutional honor. Both can be found in a case arising
from the infamous Chinese exclusion laws, Fong Yue Ting v. United
States.127 The majority asserted that it is the uniform practice of na-
tions to allow the government to decide whether to exclude or expel
aliens, while the dissenters argued that the United States “takes
nothing” from the experience of other sovereignties and distinguished
the American constitutional tradition from the terrible experiences of
religious hatred and persecution in Europe and Russia.128 This polar-
125. See Lorraine Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEFINING THE FIELD (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark
Tushnet eds., forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting
that “[t]he constitutional jurisprudence of the United States has remained remarkably un-
touched by the new constitutional comparativism”).
126. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949) (surveying English-speaking coun-
tries and finding that none excluded illegally seized evidence); see also Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 113–14 (1908) (concluding that the privilege against self-incrimination was not “the
inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government”).
127. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
128. Compare id. at 711 (noting the “inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and
independent nation” to decide whether to permit aliens to enter or remain in the country), with
id. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that deportations from Europe, for example, the expul-
sion of the Moors from Spain, the banishment of the Jews from England, and the exile of the
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ity is related to the problem of comparability, discussed below, for in
each case there is the possibility for disagreement over the compara-
bility, and hence the relevance, of whatever may be identified as the
constitutional practice of another system.
More generally, the written Constitution of the United States re-
peatedly has been distinguished from those of European nations as
embodying boundaries that the national government, or some portion
thereof, cannot transgress.129 As written constitutions have become
more widespread, references to the tyrannical practices of other coun-
tries still appear, though more in the spirit of explaining what the U.S.
Constitution was designed to prevent than in the spirit of explicit
American exceptionalism.130
Justice Frankfurter, who was probably the twentieth century’s
foremost U.S. judicial practitioner of explicit comparative analysis as
an aid to constitutional interpretation, invoked other nations’ prac-
tices both to support existing governmental practices and to challenge
others, such as the then-common practice of using coerced confes-
sions at trial.131 Unlike most other Justices who referred to foreign
practice, Frankfurter would invoke and rely on the reasoning of for-
eign tribunals (though his compass of relevant comparison was lim-
ited: he looked, as a measure of due process, to the standards of de-
Huguenots from France, are “condemned for their barbarity and cruelty” and that the United
States Constitution “takes nothing from the usages or the former action of European govern-
ments” with respect to the power to deport resident aliens).
129. See, e.g., The Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321, 372 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (“The
Constitution gives no countenance to the theory that Congress is vested with the full powers of
the British parliament . . . .”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 103 (1911) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s interpretations of statutes usurped Congress’s role as
lawmaker and asserting that when the Constitution was made, it distributed powers “among
three separate, equal and coordinate departments,” a development that “was at that time a new
feature of governmental regulation among the nations of the earth”); The Pipe Line Cases, 234
U.S. 548, 564–65 (1914) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (distinguishing written from unwritten consti-
tutions); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 366–67 (1917) (Day, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that in
the United States, the written constitution is deemed essential to constrain legislative power).
130. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217–18 (1953)
(Black, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of a hearing for an excluded alien, arguing that
dictatorships make one person’s liberty dependent on the arbitrary will of another, as in Russia
in 1934, and in Germany under Hitler, and asserting that “[o]ur Bill of Rights was written to
prevent such oppressive practices”); cf. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 844–45 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“It is true that England has moved along very well in the world without a written
constitution. But with complete familiarity with the English experience, our ancestors deter-
mined to draft a written constitution which the members of this Court are sworn to obey.”).
131. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 199 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (urg-
ing constitutional interpretation in light of the “standards of decency deeply felt and widely rec-
ognized in Anglo-American jurisdictions” and arguing that the confessions at issue would not
have been admitted in criminal trials in Canada, Australia, or India).
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cency “in a civilized society,”132 informed by “notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples”).133
Yet with few exceptions,134 the Court as a whole has been slow to
consider the constitutional practices of other nations, and slower and
more reluctant still to consider relying on or distinguishing the consti-
tutional decisions or reasoning of other courts. There is thus a second
sense in which we can imagine a “constitution in exile,” a sense that
captures something of the isolation of U.S. constitutional decision-
making from an increasingly international and transnational discourse
of constitutional interpretation.
In recent years, there have been some notable breaches in the
Court’s self-imposed exile from transnational constitutional discourse
and experiences, but with more emphasis on constitutional practices
and less on the reasoning of foreign courts’ decisions. By the phrase,
“constitutional experiences,” I mean to include both constitutional
“practices” and constitutional “decisions,” which together help consti-
tute in some sense the comparative constitutional law of a nation. A
“constitutional practice” is a practice followed in the political govern-
ance of a nation and widely understood within that nation to be (in
some sense) required by, or consistent with, its constitution even if
not the subject of judicial decisions. (An example is the practice in the
132. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
133. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter, however, was not alone in his knowledge of or
reliance on foreign practice as it bore on constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 465–72 (1942) (Roberts, J.) (citing common law, colonial practice, and current
state and English practice in refusing to hold that the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause
required the appointment of counsel in a state criminal trial). Justice Douglas, for example,
utilized his knowledge of other nations’ constitutional treatment of religions to insist on a dis-
tinctively “American ideal of religious liberty.” See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575–
76 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Nigerian and Indian constitutional approaches
from that of the First Amendment).
134. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text. Although a number of Justices in the
Court’s history have made the kind of general references to foreign government or constitu-
tional experience described above, Justice Frankfurter, at least until quite recently, was the Jus-
tice most likely to invoke foreign precedent and practice. He did so not only in his efforts to give
meaning to the Due Process Clause, see supra notes 132–33, but also in federalism cases dealing
with intergovernmental tax immunities, see, e.g., United States v. Allegheny Co., 322 U.S. 174,
198 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting that federal constitutional relations in Canada
were identical to those in the United States for purposes of the issue and citing a specific deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada as pertinent to why the United States Supreme Court
should deny the claim of the federal government); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S.
466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the intergovernmental tax immunity
case raised the “same legal issues” as in Australia and Canada under particular provisions of
their constitutions). For a brief description of the uses of foreign constitutional experience by
current members of the Court, see infra notes 141–52 and accompanying text.
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United States of holding elections every two years for the House of
Representatives.)135 Although a constitutional practice also might be
the result of a constitutional court decision, by “constitutional deci-
sions,” I intend to refer to two other subcategories of “constitutional
experience”: explicitly constitutional reasoning (typically found in the
decisions of constitutional courts) and the bottom line of those judi-
cial decisions (which, if complied with, will constitute a constitutional
practice as well). Over the course of its history, the United States Su-
preme Court has referred to the experiences of other nations in the
sense of their constitutional practices (i.e., what is permitted or re-
quired by their systems of governance).136 It has only occasionally
cited the decisions of foreign courts and almost never, in a majority
opinion, relied on the constitutional reasoning of other nations’
courts, though individual Justices on occasion have done so.137 It is in
135. As I argue elsewhere, constitutional practices comprise an important part of the “in-
visible constitution” that constitutes American constitutionalism. Many of these practices are
drawn less clearly from the Constitution’s text than the biennial elections of representatives but
must nonetheless be understood as a part of the Constitution to appreciate the meaning and
framework of the constitutional law developed in the courts. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Invisible
Constitution 8–9 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (de-
scribing, inter alia, military self-abnegation in political elections). Constitutional practices may
include practices that, if not required by, are consistent with a constitution, or even may be at
variance with the formal terms of a constitution. For example, leading scholars report that in
Britain, although nominally any peer could sit on the House of Lords acting as a court, the last
time this occurred was in 1883, and the lay peer was ignored by the law lords. S.E. FINER ET AL.,
COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 57 (1995) (reporting also that the monarch still possesses formal
authority to veto a bill enacted by Parliament but that such authority has not been used since
1707).
136. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (referring to labor statutes in
Great Britain, Switzerland, Austria, Holland, and Germany as bearing on the reasonableness of
a state law regulating working conditions for women challenged on due process grounds); see
also John Wolff, The Utility of Foreign Law to the Practicing Lawyer, 27 A.B.A. J. 253 (1941)
(discussing Muller as an example of the contributions foreign legal principles can make to the
growth of U.S. constitutional law).
137. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 n.11 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., joined
only by Stewart, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (quoting, inter alia, from an Irish
justice’s dissenting opinion). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a notable exception, in
that the opinion of the Court on a constitutional question invoked and relied not only on foreign
experience but also on the reasoning in foreign judicial opinions. See id. at 488 n.59 (quoting,
inter alia, from a 1954 decision by the Lord Justice General of India, a foreign judicial decision
also quoted at length in Justice Frankfurter’s Culombe opinion, 367 U.S. at 592 n.34). Foreign
constitutional materials are discussed as relevant authority in both the majority and dissenting
opinions. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486–90 (invoking and relying on experiences in other coun-
tries and quoting the Lord Chancellor of England); id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the cited foreign experiences are not persuasive because in other respects those systems
give the prosecution advantages that are denied to prosecutors in the United States). Positing a
distinction between constitutional decisionmaking and other forms of legal adjudication, the
majority characterized the foreign decisions it invoked as generally motivated by considerations
of justice, not by a constitution or interpretation thereof, and argued that the United States
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the latter sense that the United States Supreme Court differs mark-
edly from many other constitutional courts, which not only manifest
awareness of the constitutional practices of other nations, but also
cite and consider the reasoning of foreign constitutional courts’ deci-
sions.138
To some extent, the relative absence of reliance on the reasoning
of other constitutional courts is a function of the relative ages of the
constitutions and the depth of the body of domestic precedents with
which the Court must grapple.139 It is not surprising that courts faced
for the first time with difficult constitutional questions would look to
established bodies of decisions that address similar issues. Since the
United States Supreme Court has been grappling with constitutional
questions for a long time, longer than most currently functioning con-
stitutional courts in the world, it may well have been efficient for
judges on foreign courts to look to its decisions to see how Justices
have framed the issues over time. Since the Supreme Court has its
own wide body of precedent available, the relative utility of consid-
ering foreign courts’ reasoning is diminished. But this argument ac-
counts only for some difference, not for the virtual exclusion of for-
eign reasoning from the U.S. Reports, since the Court also faces
issues that are arguably outside of, or plainly unresolved by, existing
doctrine, as was the case both in Printz on executive commandeering
and on the question of hate speech regulation in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul.140
should “give at least as much protection to . . . rights grounded in a specific requirement of the
Fifth Amendment” as other jurisdictions give based on principles of justice “not so specifically
defined.” Id. at 489–90.
138. See, e.g., Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 31–32 (invalidating a Canadian
abortion law and extensively discussing U.S. cases); State of Kerala v. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C.
490, 516–19 (dealing with affirmative action in India on behalf of disadvantaged castes and in-
cluding a discussion of several United States Supreme Court opinions); State v. Makwanyane,
1995 (3) SALR 391, 415–24, 451–53 (CC) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional in South
Africa and discussing and disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court’s more recent
cases).
139. See Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:
Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 583, 599 (1999). For more general analyses of the factors influencing citation of foreign deci-
sions on constitutional or human rights law by courts around the world, see McCrudden, supra
note 11, at 516–27; Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 322, 326–29 (1957).
140. 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding a bias crime law invalid under the First Amendment).
In addition, the style of opinion writing in the United States, a residue of the common-law ori-
gins of most judicial systems in the United States, may pose a barrier to thinking about or refer-
ring to comparative practice: it is not at all uncommon for a decision of the Supreme Court to
begin either with a statement of the facts, or a description of the U.S. precedents and of how the
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But the Court’s manifest awareness of other constitutional sys-
tems is on the rise, a phenomenon I would expect to continue. Chief
Justice Rehnquist has cited decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court
and the then–West German Constitutional Court in his opinions on
abortion and right-to-die issues.141 Justice Breyer has made what ap-
pears to be a concerted effort to discuss the decisions of other consti-
tutional courts, not only in his well-known exchange with Justice
Scalia in the Printz case, but also in his concurring opinion in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC,142 and in a dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Knight v. Florida.143 Also of note is Justice Scalia’s in-
vocation of the election laws of other democracies, including Austra-
lia, Canada, and England, in his dissenting opinion in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission144 to support his argument that the ma-
jority was wrong to hold unconstitutional a ban on anonymous pam-
phleteering in a local election.145 And Justice O’Connor has publicly
endorsed the importance of federal judges in the United States be-
coming more aware of international and comparative practice.146
Justice Scalia rejected the relevance of comparative constitu-
tional practice in resolving questions of American federalism in
issue at hand is situated with respect to those precedents. In this mode of reasoning by analogy
from one fact pattern to another, a court may find it difficult to “fit” in a consideration of the
practices of another system, especially if they involve different starting points.
141. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (citing foreign decisions,
including those of the Canadian and Colombian Supreme Courts); Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the West German Constitutional Court).
In Glucksberg, Justice Souter also commented on the difficulties of drawing any empirical con-
clusions from the limited experience of the Netherlands with assisted suicide, see 521 U.S. at 786
(Souter, J., concurring), a phenomenon Professor McCrudden has labeled “empirical” use of
foreign experience, as distinct from reliance on foreign decisions as authority. McCrudden, su-
pra note 11, at 525–26.
142. 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the Court’s balancing ap-
proach in complex First Amendment cases “is consistent with that of other constitutional courts
facing similarly complex constitutional problems” and citing decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada).
143. 528 U.S. 990, 995–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to decisions of the Privy
Council concerning the death penalty in Jamaica and of the Supreme Court of India to demon-
strate, inter alia, that a “lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel”).
144. 514 U.S. 334, 381–82 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers
Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2; see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1117–23 (2000) (describing the par-
ticipation of U.S. judges, including Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, in processes of global judicial interchanges).
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Printz on the rather broad ground that comparative experience is
relevant only in making, not interpreting, a constitution.147 He sought
in Stanford v. Kentucky148 to narrowly cabin the relevance of other
countries’ practices on the question of what constitutes cruel or un-
usual punishment. But in McIntyre Scalia invoked comparative prac-
tice in dissent to defend the constitutionality of Ohio’s ban on
anonymous pamphleteering.149 His willingness to invoke comparative
practice in other democracies on the interpretation of the First
Amendment in the context of the Ohio disclosure law is in some ten-
sion with his broad rejection of the relevance of comparative constitu-
tional experience in Printz. Were the relevant factor for Justice Scalia
the difference between using a foreign experience to sustain rather
than to strike down a law,150 it might have been appropriate for him to
have considered the practice in other democracies before writing the
Court’s opinion striking down a local hate speech law in R.A.V. v.
147. 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
148. 492 U.S. 361, 368–69 & n.1 (1989) (rejecting a claim that imposition of the death pen-
alty for individuals under eighteen years of age at the time of the crime violates the Eighth
Amendment and stating that practices in other countries cannot establish “the Eighth Amend-
ment prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people” but can be relevant only to
determining “whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,
but rather so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place . . . in our Con-
stitution” (citations omitted)); see supra note 121.
149. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The third and last question relevant to our decision is whether the prohibition of
anonymous campaigning is effective in protecting and enhancing democratic elec-
tions. In answering this question no, the Justices of the majority set their own views—
on a practical matter that bears closely upon the real-life experience of elected politi-
cians and not upon that of unelected judges—up against the views of 49 . . . state leg-
islatures and the federal Congress. We might also add to the list on the other side the
legislatures of foreign democracies: Australia, Canada, and England, for example, all
have prohibitions upon anonymous campaigning. See, e.g., Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918, § 328 (Australia); Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. E-2, § 261 (1985); Rep-
resentation of the People Act, 1983, § 110 (England).
150. Compare this possible explanation for Justice Scalia’s invocation of foreign experience
in McIntyre to the limited scope for foreign experience that he would allow in defining the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–70 n.1 (1989)
(noting that American conceptions of decency are controlling in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, with the limited exception that foreign practice can help illuminate whether an
American practice is simply a “historical accident” or is implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty). Under Justice Scalia’s approach in Stanford, foreign practice would never be directly rele-
vant to whether a practice followed in a number of American jurisdictions is “cruel and un-
usual,” but could serve only to confirm that existing practices in the United States (against
which the constitutionality of a singular deviation by one or a very small number of states is
measured) are no historical accident. In this setting then, although foreign practice could sup-
port a decision invalidating a particular state law, they could do so only by lending more weight
to the constitutional validity of most states’ existing laws. In any event, as noted above, this pos-
sible explanation is in tension with Justice Scalia’s objection to Justice Breyer’s reliance on for-
eign experience to sustain the federal statue at issue in Printz.
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City of St. Paul151 (hate speech laws having been upheld by some for-
eign constitutional courts).152 Although I do not count Justice Scalia as
an enthusiast for learning from comparative constitutional experi-
ence, he and other members of the Court within the last eight years
have referred to the constitutional practices or constitutional court
decisions of other nations. What are we to think of this?
B. The Benefits of Comparative Constitutional Knowledge: “Exile”
and Legitimacy
Understanding comparative constitutional experiences would
benefit constitutional adjudication in the United States. A number of
constitutional systems around the world now have judicially enforce-
able protections of freedom of expression, equality of treatment, hu-
man liberty, and freedom from inhumane punishments.153 Decisions of
foreign courts can inform decisionmaking by U.S. courts, not only by
suggesting ways of reasoning about common areas of human experi-
ence, but also by providing a basis against which divergent judgments
can be tested. Confrontation with and reasoning about the relevance
and persuasive value of significant foreign decisions on analogous
problems adds to the mechanisms of accountability, through reason-
giving, that constrain politically independent constitutional courts.154
In addition, there may be reputational reasons for U.S. courts to
demonstrate greater familiarity with major constitutional develop-
ments around the world.
151. 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
152. See, e.g., The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699 (Can.) (upholding a convic-
tion under a hate speech law, rejecting a constitutional challenge, and concluding that the law
was a proportionate and justified limitation upon freedom of expression). For a detailed discus-
sion of Keegstra, see Jackson, supra note 139, at 611–17. Both the Eighth Amendment, at issue
in Stanford, and the First Amendment have been “incorporated” against the states under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so that the limited inquiry into foreign de-
cisions Justice Scalia contemplated in Stanford, might have been applicable as well in R.A.V. See
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369–70 & n.1 (referring to the standard of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)), for determining whether particular provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the
states because they are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause).
153. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, §§ 2, 7, 12, 15 (Can.); Arts. 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 102 GG,
translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (GERMANY) 106–07, 113,
152 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flonz eds., 1994).
154. On the values of reason-giving in constraining and legitimizing judicial decisions see,
for example, Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312,
349–52, 410–11 (1997); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1482 (2000); cf. Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1753–55 (1995) (noting that reason-giving is properly prized in law to
avoid arbitrary decisions).
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1. Arguments for Comparative Constitutional Knowledge from
Internal Utility. There are at least four kinds of arguments for what I
would call the “internal utility” of being aware of and considering the
constitutional practices and constitutional decisions of other sys-
tems.155 By internal utility I mean the (partly imagined and idealized)
process by which a judge reasons about and decides a case for herself.
First, as Professor Donald Kommers and others suggest, under-
standing what “the law” is, or how roughly comparable bodies have
interpreted roughly similar constitutional provisions, can help illumi-
nate constitutional commitments to an idea like freedom of speech.156
155. For purposes of this Essay, I place less weight on the role of foreign constitutional deci-
sions in what others have called “judicial economy—not having to reinvent the wheel.”
McCrudden, supra note 11, at 514. Although there are relatively new issues in American consti-
tutional law on which the approaches of other constitutional systems can be quite helpful, see
supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing hate speech and executive commandeering),
in the view of the Justices it is the rare case in which they will regard other nations as having
“invented a wheel” that would be of use to the United States. Moreover, arguments from judi-
cial economy alone are unlikely to be persuasive to a Court that, unlike many others, has almost
complete control of the size and scope of its docket and that has dramatically reduced its docket
of fully argued cases in the last decade.
I do not consider here the range of arguments for reliance on precedent that derive
from considerations of obligations of fairness or of treating like cases alike. For helpful general
discussions of this point, see McCrudden, supra note 11, at 513–15; Frederick Schauer, Prece-
dent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344,
1349 (1990). The applicability of such arguments in the transnational setting is complex and, as
McCrudden suggests, might be importantly affected by whether the decisionmaker is seen as
“responsible” for the decision in both the case at hand and the potential precedent, McCrudden,
supra note 11, at 513, a condition unlikely to exist where one national court considers the rele-
vance of a decision of a different national court. Moreover, as I discuss below, where federal
systems are concerned there is an important sense in which each federal system is built by par-
ticularized compromises and thus different, so in this field arguments about fairness or about
treating likes alike are peculiarly likely to be inapt.
156. See Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 691–95 (1976); see also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari) (noting that national courts “that ac-
cept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty” have nonetheless held that lengthy delays in
carrying out the death penalty render its application invalid). Justice Breyer’s project is in part
the legitimation of resort to comparative constitutional materials, as the following statement
illustrates:
[T]his Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign
courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional stan-
dards in roughly comparable circumstances. In doing so, the Court has found par-
ticularly instructive opinions of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those
opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (consid-
ering practices of Anglo-American nations regarding executing juveniles); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) (noting that the doctrine of felony murder
has been eliminated or restricted in England, India, Canada, and a “number of other
Commonwealth countries”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (ob-
serving that only 3 of 60 nations surveyed in 1965 retained the death penalty for
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On this view, even an “originalist” might endorse comparative consti-
tutional reasoning to the extent that a claim of something like univer-
sal meaning is plausible.157 Interestingly, though, this idea of looking
to foreign practices to inform our understanding of the law depends
in part on the idea that constitutional law is distinctive and to some
extent autonomous from culture, historical contingencies, politics,
and so forth.158 Such uses of comparative constitutional law might re-
rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (noting that only 2 of 84 countries
surveyed imposed denationalization as a penalty for desertion). See also Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8 (1997) (surveying other nations’ laws regarding
assisted suicide); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583–84 n.25, 588 (1961) (con-
sidering English practice concerning police interrogation of suspects); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183–89 (1881) (referring to the practices of British Parlia-
ment in determining whether the House of Representatives has the power to hold a
witness in contempt). . . . In these cases, the foreign courts I have mentioned have
considered roughly comparable questions under roughly comparable legal standards.
Each court has held or assumed that those standards permit application of the death
penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their views are useful even though not binding.
Id. at 997–98.
157. If one believes that the “sovereign” entity creating the constitution—whether it be the
drafters or ratifiers—meant a particular phrase or concept in a sense that they understood to be
universal, or if the sovereign entity intended that universal or transnational norms be consulted
to determine the phrase or concept’s meaning over time or in particular settings, then resort to
transnational constitutional experience would be entirely consistent with originalist assump-
tions. I do not refer here to interpretive methods that look at the practices of the predecessor
government in Britain as either positively informing what the Framers intended or as negative
examples of what they opposed. Compare, e.g., The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 372 (1903)
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing Congress from the British Parliament), with Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 759–69 (1996) (discussing the British courts-martial practice as
bearing on the scope of presidential and congressional powers); see also, e.g., United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 38 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (invoking British and American
common law treatment of monopoly power); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51–
57 (1911) (discussing English and American law on monopolies). My argument is not about the
relevance of English law as either a negative or positive precedent, but is rather about the pos-
sibility of an “original intent” that some aspects of the Constitution—for example, the meaning
of “war” for purposes of Congress’s power to declare war—be understood to have transnational
meaning. Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 693, 697–99 (1862) (Nelson, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Congress’s war power must be understood in light of the law of nations and
usages of “all civilized countries”).
158. For an argument that constitutional courts deciding human rights questions have an
interest in establishing the “relative autonomy of human rights law through the sources of
authority and style of judgment” used, see McCrudden, supra note 11, at 502. See also Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 121–23
(1995) (arguing that engagement with foreign court decisions supports a court’s own autonomy).
Query whether human rights law is a new/old “brooding omnipresence,” built up through com-
parative, transnational discourse that implies the existence of some universal “law” apart from
the will of particular sovereigns. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1155–77 (1987) (arguing that the founding generation did not intend their
written Constitution to displace prior fundamental law and thus suggesting that some “unwrit-
ten” or natural law might survive as a source of fundamental law). Have notions of sovereignty
become sufficiently diffuse and complex to make plausible the idea of transnational human
rights law as both in some sense positively willed by sovereigns and at the same time autono-
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inforce the stature and independence of courts as legal decisionmak-
ers, by reinforcing the idea that law is discoverable uniquely by judges
and lawyers. While it is an approach that can relate back to intention-
alist, positivist theories of law,159 it also is an approach with affinities
to natural law traditions, with transnational omnipresences a measure
of the correctness of a legal rule.
A second reason to look at other constitutional traditions is, as
Professor Tushnet suggests, to better understand the nature of one’s
own constitutional tradition, either with a view to changing and re-
constituting that tradition or of preserving and advancing it.160 To the
extent that one regards the expression or reconstruction of a nation’s
aspirations and commitments as a valid purpose of constitutional in-
terpretation, awareness of other constitutional traditions may be
helpful in providing both building blocks and contrasts. Historically,
many U.S. references to other constitutional systems seem wrought
up in a project of American constitutional exceptionalism that is ex-
pressive and self-constituting in nature. Although in the past Ameri-
can constitutional exceptionalism has been invoked to place the
United States at the forefront of “progressive” constitutionalism,
“ahead” of other countries,161 judges today may worry that resort to
the decisions of other constitutional tribunals will suggest that the
United States Supreme Court is “behind” in some areas—making re-
sort to comparison less palatable to those convinced, at some level, of
the “natural” superiority of their own system. Under this “expressive”
view, constitutional law has a somewhat more malleable cast, expres-
sive not only of traditional identities or aspirations, but also available
mously developed by transnational jurists? On changing notions of sovereignty, see generally
NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE AND NATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999).
159. See supra note 157 (arguing that resort to comparative experience as an aid to interpre-
tation would be legitimate for a positivist originalist if the original sovereign creating the law
intended that a phrase be used in some universal or transnational sense, or intended that univer-
sal or transnational legal norms be consulted to determine its meaning over time or in particular
settings).
160. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1269–85 (1999). This “expressive” possibility of comparative constitutional law, to the ex-
tent it focuses on the distinctiveness of particular constitutional approaches or traditions, may
be in considerable tension with the first possibility, discussed above, which focuses more on the
transnational commonalities of constitutional law.
161. For example, the United States Constitution has been distinguished from the practice
of parliamentary sovereignty, or governance without a written constitution, in tones suggesting
that the United States’s practice is an advance. See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 366–67
(1917) (Day, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884)); The Pipe
Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 564 (1914) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
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for reconstructive projects. Comparative experience can provide both
an illuminating mirror and a set of alternative visions for those who
seek to change existing legal cultures.162
Third, as both Professor Tushnet and Justice Breyer suggest, the
experience of other nations can have significant internal utility for le-
gal interpretation by demonstrating different approaches to similar
“functional” questions. To the extent that workability is a criterion
for deciding what interpretation of a constitutional provision is best,
the approaches of foreign nations can help identify the consequences
of different reasonably justifiable interpretations plausibly open to
the decisionmaker.163 Justice Breyer is plainly willing to consider the
functional experience of other nations’ constitutional choices, at least
where the text, precedent, and history of the U.S. system do not pro-
vide clear answers to constitutional questions. (Depending on one’s
theory of constitutional interpretation, even where domestic sources
speak to the interpretive question with more clarity, foreign experi-
ence still might be thought relevant.)164 Justice Breyer’s suggestion
that comparative experience can illuminate the consequences of dif-
ferent interpretive judgments echoes Professor Kadish’s argument,
made in the context of procedural due process issues, about the rele-
vance of comparative procedural practice. Professor Kadish argued
that comparative constitutional practice in the procedural area is
most relevant “as a basis for predicting the factual consequences of
the suggested attenuation of procedures and as evidence of whether
those consequences are compatible with the commitments of a free
162. See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP.
L. 683, 695 (1998) (discussing comparative law as a “unique opportunity to generate critical,
subversive self-reflections about American law”).
163. Justice Breyer’s assertion that understanding the consequences of different choices is
relevant to constitutional decisionmaking is inconsistent with more formalist approaches to in-
terpretation and thus not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 644–45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (questioning the appropriateness of considering the
consequences in examining the constitutionality of a federal tax).
164. One may regard legal sources, including the decisions of other constitutional courts, as
being binding, or as nonbinding but relevant authority that must be considered, or as of only
possible relevance and persuasive value that may be considered. See, e.g., McCrudden, supra
note 11, at 502–03 (citing H.P. Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 264 (1987)); see
also S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, pt. 39 §§ (1)(b), (1)(c) (1997) (instructing South African courts that
they must consider international law and may consider foreign law when interpreting the South
African Bill of Rights). I make no claim that foreign constitutional decisions are “binding” on
questions of United States constitutional law, nor even that, as a matter of United States consti-
tutional law, foreign constitutional law “must” be considered. Rather, it is my claim, both the
constitutional practices and the constitutional decisions of other constitutional democracies may
be relevant and may be considered.
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society.”165 Moreover, where constitutional doctrine requires a judicial
evaluation of the rationality of a legislative provision, the presence of
similar provisions in other polities might support finding minimal ra-
tionality or reasonableness.166 As noted above, Justice Scalia appears
to have considered foreign experience in other democracies as a rele-
vant factor in evaluating the constitutionality under the First
Amendment of a ban on anonymous pamphleteering.167
In short, understanding comparative constitutional law can be
helpful in discerning the meaning of terms or provisions that have a
transnational meaning; can illuminate the particularities of one’s own
constitutional experience to better enable constitution interpreters to
constitute and reconstitute the constitutional narrative; and can shed
light on the functional consequences or rationality of different rules.
Fourth, and more speculatively, participating in transnational
constitutional discourse may strengthen both the quality of decisions
and the power of reason-giving as a mechanism of accountability for
165. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 354 (1957). Recognizing the difficulties of comparison, Kadish
argued that the problem of comparability was familiar to social scientists, who are unable to
conduct controlled experiments. Id. As I will argue below, comparability is a major limitation on
the kinds of uses that I think can fruitfully be made of comparative constitutional study in the
area of federalism.
166. “Minimal rationality” is an aspect of the “proportionality” test, at least as used in Can-
ada. The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 141. “Rationality,” “reasonableness” and kindred
concepts have played important roles in U.S. constitutional law. For the majority in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the question was the “reasonableness” of the conditions New
York attached to the bakers’ liberty of contract. Id. at 53. Similarly, the dissent invoked stan-
dards of reasonableness but relied on foreign experience to show that the standard was met. See
id. at 68, 71–72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “civilized peoples” have deliberated on the
question of working hours and reciting the average working hours in various nations); see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 635 (1996) (finding that a prohibition on the enactment of
laws to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation fails a “rational relation” test and
therefore is unconstitutional); supra note 136; cf. Tushnet, supra note 160, at 1233 n.36 (de-
scribing Justice Breyer’s analysis in Printz as perhaps resting on “the proposition that legislation
is constitutional unless . . . it is arbitrary or irrational [and] [c]omparative analysis might show
that the legislation is not arbitrary”).
167. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). After concluding that the Constitu-
tion’s original meaning was difficult to discern, but that the practice of U.S. states in prohibiting
anonymous electioneering supported the ban, 514 U.S. at 375, Justice Scalia addressed three
relevant questions, including “whether the prohibition of anonymous campaigning is effective in
protecting and enhancing democratic elections,” id. at 381, a question of “common sense” in-
formed by respect “for the practical judgment” of legislators both in the United States and in
foreign democracies, id. at 378. His reference to other nations’ practices might, then, be taken to
reflect both on the functional workability of such a rule in democracies (is it “effective”?) and
on the rationality of legislatures (exercising “practical judgment” about elections, a subject with
which they had more familiarity than judges) in adopting such a rule. See supra note 166 and
accompanying text.
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politically independent judges. The working mechanisms of judicial
accountability in the U.S. constitutional system at present are largely
not coercive ones.168 They are the constraints of reasoned response:
how do the Court’s decisions and reasons fare among the general
public and knowledgeable commentators? As has been said about the
benefits of consulting the “constitutional views of our predecessors,”
“[t]he more varied the participants in the [constitutional] conversa-
tion the richer it will be and the more satisfactory will be its results.”169
Confronting the power of others’ ideas about common problems or
concerns can, in other words, contribute to a better intellectual prod-
uct and can also impose the discipline of explanation upon the deci-
sionmaker.170
If a U.S. jurist knows of a significant foreign court (the authority
of the decisionmaker contributing to the weight its views would be
accorded) that produced a reasoned opinion on a pending issue,171 its
reasoning can be considered, whether as logic to adopt as persuasive,
to distinguish as inapplicable, or to reject as mistaken.172 Even if the
168. Although Congress formally has power over appropriations, or to change the term of
Court or number of Justices, these powers for the most part have not been used in recent dec-
ades to constrain the Court. Although Congress has sought to restrict federal court jurisdiction
in habeas cases, the Supreme Court itself has retained appellate jurisdiction over such claims.
See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 238–39 (1998) (treating a 1996 federal statute designed
to restrict review in habeas corpus proceedings as leaving undisturbed the Supreme Court’s
power to review the lower court’s denial of a certificate of appealability); Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 661–63 (1996) (recognizing the continued availability of original habeas corpus juris-
diction in the Supreme Court).
169. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 695 (1987).
170. See Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 287, 291 (2001). Justice Kirby of
the High Court of Australia suggests the benefit of looking to decisions outside one’s own na-
tion “to stimulate [the] mind with analogous reasoning.” Id.
171. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to consult the reasoning and decisions of
state and lower federal courts, not because their decisions on questions of federal law are
authoritative, but because they help the Justices better reach (or, in the case of highly regarded
lower court judges, better justify, see infra note 172) their own decisions. See, e.g., County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (quoting Judge Friendly’s Second Circuit decision
in 1973); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129–30 (1968) (citing state court decisions and
quoting California Chief Justice Traynor). All state and federal courts in the United States can
be presumed to be doing their interpretive work under the constraint of the Supremacy Clause
and to share a common history or culture in ways that are not true of foreign courts. Decisions
of state and lower federal courts are thus at once more likely to consider “comparable” issues,
but less likely to offer the outside perspective that can be so illuminating in testing basic as-
sumptions; both kinds of nonbinding decisions can help other decisionmakers reach better-in-
formed decisions.
172. See McCrudden, supra note 11, at 516 (distinguishing between uses of foreign judg-
ments based on “authority” and “substantive” reasons). But cf. Tripathi, supra note 139, at 328
(suggesting that judges will tend to use foreign decisions only to the extent that they support the
judges’ existing predilections). To the extent this is true, though, it is a problem with many
sources of interpretive authority.
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reasoning of a foreign court ultimately is rejected, explaining why it is
inapplicable or wrong could improve the quality of the Court’s rea-
soning, making its choices more clear to the audience of lawyers,
lower courts, legislators, and citizens. The transnational discourse of
constitutional decisionmaking provides a broader arena for this kind
of constitutional accountability conversation. Considering other con-
stitutional courts’ decisions helps locate the Supreme Court in a
broader range of opinion and experience through which its constitu-
tional decisions can be constrained in their production by the judges’
awareness of competing constitutional traditions—both as a source of
approaches to be adopted or distinguished and as a reminder of the
transnational context in which their own work will be viewed.173 Par-
ticularly in a system in which constitutional decisions are not easily
changed through amendment, to the extent that awareness of transna-
tional constitutional developments tends to lead to more thoughtful
and reasoned decisions, it is surely to be valued.
2. External Legitimacy, Foreign Law and Audience. A different
but related set of possible benefits has to do with what I will call “ex-
ternal legitimacy” and communicative efficacy to different audiences.
As Professor McCrudden observes in his monograph on the uses of
comparative constitutional law in human rights decisions around the
world, invoking the decisions of other constitutional courts may serve
to enhance the legitimacy of a court’s reasoning and result before par-
ticular audiences.174 Newly established courts, McCrudden suggests,
may rely on the judgments of foreign courts to enhance their own le-
gitimacy with domestic audiences.175 Additionally, some domestic
courts may cite foreign decisions to establish themselves with an in-
ternational audience as members of the international community, en-
titled to other benefits of membership.176
173. See Weinrib, supra note 125 (manuscript at 4) (praising comparative constitutional
methodology by which judges look at “cognate constitutions” and “benefit by seeing their own
systems through the eyes of foreign judges, academics and commentators”).
174. McCrudden, supra note 11, at 502; see also Slaughter, supra note 158, at 119 (discussing
how citing foreign authorities can enhance the persuasiveness, authority, or legitimacy of a deci-
sion).
175. McCrudden, supra note 11, at 518–19.
176. Cf. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607
(1999) (noting suggestions that Hungary’s Constitutional Court invalidated the death penalty in
part to help advance Hungary’s membership in the Council of Europe). McCrudden and others
suggest a more aspirational set of reasons for the citation to foreign constitutional judgments,
including a “‘need to instill habits of Western democratic participation.’” McCrudden, supra
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In some systems, a court’s reliance on, or overt consideration of,
the reasoning of foreign or international bodies may strengthen the
court’s claim to be autonomous and independent in the ascertainment
of law, thereby increasing its apparent legitimacy.177 But if the United
States Supreme Court were to identify the reasoning of other court
systems faced with similar problems as a basis for its own decision-
making, it is a matter of some disagreement whether such overt dis-
cussion of foreign constitutional practice would detract, in the eyes of
key domestic audiences, from the authority of the Court’s decisions.178
It is to some extent an empirical question whether it is necessary, for
law to perform its coercive and legitimating functions, to speak as if it
were indigenously autonomous.179 It seems likely that this question
will not have a generalized or universal answer.
Legitimacy, in this empirical sense, depends importantly on the
audience. It may well be that Supreme Court Justices, who describe in
speeches and at judicial conferences the need for U.S. judges to learn
more about international and comparative constitutional develop-
ments, are loath to refer to them in their opinions for fear that such
citations will undermine the (perhaps already precarious) view that
what the Court does is to articulate law in a domain within which the
Court alone is supreme.
But it may also be that U.S. isolation from transnational constitu-
tional law could diminish the stature and influence of the Supreme
Court over time. As U.S. decisions come under criticism by foreign
courts,180 and to the extent that U.S. influence in constitutional devel-
note 11, at 518 (quoting GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 232 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court of Israel)).
177. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective Supra-
national Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 282 (1997) (arguing that collective deliberation
among international tribunals can “reinforce each other’s legitimacy and independence from
political interference”); see also HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM
AND SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 146, 162–71 (2000) (describing the use of
international and foreign law by South Africa’s Constitutional Court not as legal precedent but
as sources for specific lines of argument and, more generally, as supporting judicial review).
178. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
179. As others suggest, domestic courts’ consultation of international human rights law is
sometimes justified on grounds of the law’s autonomy, insofar as comparative usage rests im-
plicitly on the premise that law is a technical, specialized area. McCrudden, supra note 11, at
502; Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 177, at 370–72.
180. For examples of the recent disagreements that foreign constitutional courts have had
with U.S. constitutional decisions, see The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 687, 740–41, 743,
744 (Can.) (disagreeing with the then-trend in First Amendment law to prohibit content-based
classifications that would make unconstitutional the prohibition of hate speech); State v. Mak-
wanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 415–23, 431–34, 454–55 (CC) (S. Afr.) (disagreeing with current
American doctrine on the death penalty). For a Canadian Supreme Court Justice’s view, see
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opments elsewhere were to be supplanted by such constitutional
courts as Canada’s, South Africa’s,181 or Germany’s, Justices may seek
to express their awareness of other constitutional approaches in their
opinions (if only to sustain the Court’s stature against charges of ig-
norance).182 And, if Justices’ frames of reference or reasoning are in-
fluenced by their perceptions of other systems, then candor and
transparency values—as well as the legitimating effects of reason-
giving—would argue in favor of some acknowledgement of foreign
decisions. Finally, if Justices refer more to the constitutional decisions
of other courts, this practice to some extent will become self-
legitimating, a phenomenon that is already occurring around the
world.183
C. Addressing the Arguments Against: Of Positivism, Legitimacy,
Competence, and Comparability
Comparative constitutional knowledge and reliance thereon may
improve the quality of judicial reasoning and increase the legitimacy
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Im-
pact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 29–31, 37–39 (1998) (observing a decline in the
impact of the United States Supreme Court on other countries and identifying, among the rea-
sons for this decline, the Court’s failure to “take part in the international dialogue among the
courts of the world”).
181. No doubt I cite South Africa and Canada in part because their decisions are in English
and thus accessible to me. English may be becoming the hegemonic language not only for trade
and commerce but also for law. Cf. Philippe Van Parijs, The Ground Floor of the World: On the
Socio-Economic Consequences of Linguistic Globalization, 21 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 217, 222
(2000) (positing that English will continue to grow as a “world-wide lingua franca” as English-
speaking countries attract highly skilled immigrants).
182. As McCrudden notes, Justice Stevens already has publicly expressed concern about
how other countries will view particular decisions of the Supreme Court. McCrudden, supra
note 11, at 520 (discussing Justice Stevens’s dissent in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655, 670 (1992)). While Stevens reasoned from the preeminence of the United States Su-
preme Court and the earlier reliance of other constitutional courts on its precedents, as
McCrudden also notes, it is not inconceivable that if the Court is seen as issuing “monstrous”
decisions generally on human rights matters, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting), its influence and preeminence will decline correspondingly. McCrudden, supra note 11,
at 520. The product of the Supreme Court is subject to scrutiny not only by domestic courts’
lawyers and scholars but also at the international level. Continuing in (apparent) ignorance and
isolation is no way to maintain the relative position of the Court. To the extent that the standing
of the legal profession and law professors in the United States is related to the standing of the
United States Supreme Court in the global legal order, perhaps lawyers and legal scholars have
such reputational interests at stake in the Court’s transnational standing as well.
183. See MARY ANNE GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 158 (1991) (noting “brisk international traffic in ideas and rights”); Slaughter, supra
note 158, at 99 (stating that “[c]ourts are talking to one another all over the world”). See gener-
ally McCrudden, supra note 11, at 501 (describing as now “commonplace” judicial borrowings
from international and other national jurisdictions in interpreting human rights norms).
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of decisions before some audiences, but explicitly invoking foreign
decisions also may come at some cost to the legitimacy of decisions
before other audiences. Objections based on positivist legal theory,
legitimacy, competence, and comparability must be considered. These
objections are not, in my view, sufficient to defeat the comparative
constitutional project, but they suggest that there may be particular
limitations on courts’ use of comparative constitutional law in the
area of federalism. I elaborate on these points below.
The argument from positivism may be closely linked to an inter-
pretive strategy of originalism and to contestable assumptions about
original intent on the relevance of comparative constitutional learn-
ing.184 One argument is that U.S. courts interpret the United States
Constitution; that U.S. law can mean only what its drafters and/or
ratifiers intended or understood the words to mean in the United
States; and that foreign decisions can have no bearing on these en-
tirely domestic questions of determining the meaning of law issued
from the popular, domestic sovereign.185 My answer to this critique of
comparative constitutional analysis is in part empirical and in part
normative. As an empirical matter, it seems doubtful that the genera-
tion that framed the Declaration of Independence, which explicitly
sought to justify itself in the eyes of a cosmopolitan international
audience, would have given no thought to how their words or the
governmental structure they established would be regarded abroad.186
184. While there are constitutions that expressly require or specifically authorize interpret-
ers to consult foreign constitutional law or international law, the United States Constitution
does not do so. As Professor Tushnet suggests, a court’s authority to consult such materials may
be derived from various interpretive theories. See Tushnet, supra note 160, at 1230–38. Even if
one is committed to originalism understood as original intent, it would be relevant to ask not
only what the Framers’ intent was with respect to original intent, see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 888 (1985) (arguing that the
Framers were not committed to an originalist method of interpretation), but what their intent
would have been concerning reliance on comparative understandings for interpretive questions,
see infra note 186 (describing Justice Breyer’s reference to the Declaration of Independence’s
concern for the “opinions of mankind”).
185. See Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1996) (arguing that
American courts may rely on international law only to the extent that it is already embodied in
domestic law and that judges “are not some international priesthood empowered to impose
upon our free and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own”). As
Justice Scalia’s comment suggests, a related form of objection is from democracy—that matters
not clearly settled by the Constitution were left open to the people of the states and of the
United States to decide. Reconciling democracy with constitutionalism is a complex proposition,
whether sources of interpretation are entirely domestic or not. And to the extent that other con-
stitutional systems have considered how to reconcile a fairly rigid constitution with commit-
ments to democracy, understanding those efforts might improve our own.
186. For an implicit suggestion that the Constitution’s Framers would have intended resort
to the decisions of foreign courts on comparable issues in light of the concern manifest in the
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The Framers may well have been more cosmopolitan for their time
than today’s leading judges and lawyers, and thus may have contem-
plated that comparative learning would bear on U.S. constitutional
interpretation. As a normative matter, I am unpersuaded that such a
narrowly focused interpretive methodology as Justice Scalia’s is at-
tractive. I am skeptical that it constrains judges’ decisions as much as
Justice Scalia believes it does, and I believe that it is particularly lim-
ited in its workability in the United States in light of other rigidities in
the written Constitution.187 To the extent that a theory of interpreta-
tion allows for reliance on sources other than original sources—even
if only in some cases, as where original sources leave the matter un-
clear—there is room for comparative learning.188
A second objection to the use of comparative constitutional ex-
perience is that it might detract from the perceived legitimacy of judi-
cial decisions. This argument from legitimacy, in the empirical sense,
might militate against overt reliance on foreign law, given the impor-
tant communicative role of domestic constitutional courts in estab-
lishing their decisions as legitimate in the eyes of parties, lawyers,
Declaration of Independence for the views of other nations, see Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990,
996–97 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in compa-
rable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to the
opinions of mankind.’”).
187. Justice Scalia’s pithy suggestion in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997),
that comparative constitutional experience is relevant in writing a constitution but not in inter-
preting one, assumes a fundamental difference between “interpreting” law and making law that,
in the hardest cases, eludes capture. When the Court interprets the Constitution, it makes con-
stitutional law and can be reversed either through its own subsequent decisions or through con-
stitutional amendment.
188. Some might argue that permitting consideration of foreign sources would increase in-
terpretive methodological problems by increasing the range of what can be considered and thus
aggravating the problem of allowing judges to give effect to their personal discretion or value
judgments and call it law. It might be argued on these grounds that consulting comparative con-
stitutional law and experience is less legitimate (because of its greater tendency to proliferate
discretionary sources) than consulting sources within one’s own federal system and because it is
not constrained by a theory of precedent within a single defined, hierarchical legal system. I am
inclined to think such factors may go to the weight but not to the admissibility of comparative
reasoning. On the one hand, multiplying the number and direction of precedents at a theoretical
level may increase the range of permissible legal judgment. But it is important to remember that
a likely consideration of comparative constitutional material would be bounded by preliminary
considerations of comparability: the Court is unlikely to be influenced by decisions from any
one country that is not highly comparable (i.e., a sizeable, well-established democracy). Cf.
David Fontana, Refined Comparativism: Towards an American System for the Uses of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 23, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that comparability is a precondition for the use of com-
parative constitutional law). To the extent that a number of countries are coming to a similar
conclusion on a constitutional problem that has not been considered in the United States,
moreover, it would improve the decisional process to be aware of that approach, if only for the
purpose of analyzing why it would not be a good approach in this country.
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lower court judges, and, most importantly, the people of their own na-
tion. Although the claim that law is a wholly autonomous discipline is
one that few legal scholars would seek today to defend,189 there are
complicated questions relating to the legitimacy of judicial decision-
making that bear on the degree to which law, in the voice of the
Court, should acknowledge its lack of autonomy. Thus, it has been
suggested that courts in the United States should perhaps consider
and be aware of other systems’ approaches but should not acknowl-
edge them in written opinions.190 To acknowledge consideration of
foreign sources of constitutional law would be to delegitimize deci-
sions in U.S. legal discourse—or so the argument goes.
Legitimacy in this external sense—in bolstering the reception of
its decisions, the Court’s own stature, or the national polity’s sense of
belonging to an enlightened community of nations—will depend on
the efficacy of the authority invoked.191 As an empirical matter, then,
the legitimacy of using foreign constitutional law is highly contingent,
and changeable. The relationship in the United States between le-
gitimacy and non–citation to foreign sources is suggested by Justice
Thomas’s rejoinder to Justice Breyer’s dissent from the denial of cer-
tiorari in Knight v. Florida. There was nothing, Justice Thomas as-
serted, in “U.S. constitutional tradition or U.S. precedents” to sup-
port the “neoteric” claim Justice Breyer advanced concerning the
Eighth Amendment;192 if there were anything in the U.S. tradition,
189. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 778 (1987) (calling for a “return to an older style” of judicial opin-
ion writing “in which formalistic crutches—such as the canons of statutory construction and the
pretense of deterministic precedent—that exaggerate the autonomous elements in legal rea-
soning are replaced by a more candid engagement with the realistic premises of decision”); cf.
Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996) (noting that “most scholars agree that law can
no longer sustain itself as an autonomous discipline”). But cf. id. at 1428–29 (arguing for a new
synthesis of legal theory toward exploration of institutional questions including autonomy of law
and how it interacts with political institutions).
190. Cf. McCrudden, supra note 11, at 515 (generally noting the possibility of courts’ relying
on but not acknowledging foreign decisions).
191. McCrudden notes, as an empirical matter, a tendency to invoke decisions from consti-
tutional courts of countries with which one’s own country is allied, rather than otherwise. Id. at
521–23.
192. 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1990) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). As he
elaborated,
I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this
Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the pano-
ply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is
delayed. Indeed, were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be
unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human
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Breyer would not need to look to other traditions. Justice Breyer’s ci-
tations to foreign courts’ decisions thus is treated as a symptom of il-
legitimacy; the invocation of foreign sources could mean only that a
claim has no support in domestic law (and hence is illegitimate).193
Yet, as suggested in Section A above, foreign constitutional ex-
perience has been alluded to, episodically, by members of the Court,
past and present.194 My current sense is that the absence of greater
mention is due to some combination of lack of knowledge and a gen-
eral belief that the U.S. experience is singularly advanced, rather than
to any sustained view in the Court that such practice is not relevant or
legitimate to consider. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s apparent theory for re-
ferring to foreign practice in the McIntyre case bears a striking re-
semblance to that advanced by Justice Breyer in Printz. Having found
the First Amendment issue to be essentially open in terms of original
intent, Justice Scalia concluded that understanding the consequences
of the challenged rule for democracies would be helpful; it was in this
context that his reference to foreign legislative practice appears.195
Thus, even a Justice who has denied the relevance of comparative
constitutional practice in “interpreting” constitutions on occasion has
found comparative experience worthy of consideration.
As the United States joins more international treaties and
agreements, as communications and information technologies make
Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy
Council.
Id. at 990.
193. Professor McCrudden notes that despite efforts by scholars and Justice Frankfurter in
the 1950s to encourage cross-national analysis in giving meaning to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, the technique was seldom used after Frankfurter was “marginalized.”
McCrudden, supra note 11, at 508–10, 527. Yet the five-page discussion by the majority in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486–90 (1966), of foreign experience with providing warnings
to suspects, recapitulates some of Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy treatment of the issue in his
opinion announcing the Court’s judgment in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581–84
(1961). For an extended effort to establish the historic legitimacy of comparative constitutional
law in the United States, see Fontana, supra note 188 (manuscript at 42–60).
194. See supra notes 126–33, 141–49 and accompanying text. For a somewhat stronger claim
about the presence of comparative constitutional law in the U.S. tradition, see Fontana, supra
note 188 (manuscript at 42) (exploring the “long history of American judges using comparative
constitutional law in their judicial opinions”). But see McCrudden, supra note 11, at 510 (“The
USA is now remarkable among precedent-based jurisdictions in citing foreign courts so rarely in
the human rights context.”).
195. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381–82 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that where the Constitution’s text and history are inconclusive it is appropriate to look at the
experiences of comparable systems in order to understand the consequences of proposed alter-
native constitutional interpretations).
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more of the world’s legal decisions more readily available, as lawyers
practice more in international settings, and as law students learn more
about international and comparative law, the posture of illegitimacy
is, I believe, likely to change. Lower court judges, lawyers, scholars,
and journalists—who function, in some sense, as the first evaluators
of the “legitimacy” of judicial reasoning and as filters through which
broader public evaluation proceeds—will themselves be more ex-
posed to international sources of decision, benefiting from interna-
tional travel and communication with legal and public opinion elites
in other countries. Greater knowledge seems inevitable and, with it,
greater engagement will seem increasingly legitimate.
A third objection, based on competence, is often raised to the
consideration of, much less reliance on, foreign constitutional experi-
ence, including judicial decisions. Judges on U.S. courts, so the argu-
ment goes, were trained in U.S. law schools in U.S. law. So, too, were
their law clerks and most of the lawyers who practice before them.
They thus lack the expertise to properly research, understand, and
evaluate foreign constitutional court decisions, even if the only com-
petency required was competency in law. To the extent one believes
that to evaluate constitutional law one must understand the broader
historical, political, and cultural framework within which constitu-
tional governance works, the competency argument assumes larger
proportions. Moreover, judges exercise government power and make
actual decisions in a real-world time frame; they do not have the lux-
ury of extended time for study that academics (it is thought) have.
I would respond to these concerns with a plea in avoidance: let us
assume that it is true that most U.S. judges and lawyers have only
minimal, if any, competence in understanding foreign legal systems.
That being so, however, does not justify its continuing to be so. It
suggests that judges (and lawyers and academics) should approach
what they learn about foreign legal sources with humility and skepti-
cism, at the same time that the technical capacity of (at least) the Su-
preme Court (including its librarians and law clerks) to evaluate the
relevance, weight, and soundness of foreign constitutional sources is
increased.
The fourth objection to considering comparative constitutional
law in interpreting the United States Constitution—the difficulty in
determining comparability—is of a different order and of particular
relevance to federalism. One of the great benefits of studying com-
parative constitutional experience is the possibility of illuminating—
as choices—those aspects of one’s own system that are perceived
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from within as necessary. It is, for example, possible to have a vibrant
federal system, as in Germany, where it is the responsibility of the
“states” to enforce federal law, so Printz’s holding should be seen not
as a necessity of a federal system, but as a choice. But at the moment
of insight, the comparability issue must be confronted. How compa-
rable is the rest of the German federal system? Does “commandeer-
ing” pose the same difficulties in a system, such as Germany’s, in
which members of the state-level governments sit as the second
chamber of the national legislative body, as it poses in the United
States, with its popularly elected senators? Does a rule against com-
mandeering have the same meaning in Germany, where federal leg-
islation on some subjects must be in the form of “framework” or gen-
eral principles, with the state-level governments having the power and
duty to fill in the details at their own legislative level?196 Does the con-
stitutionally mandated “equalization” of the per capita revenues of
the state-level governments in Germany affect the compatibility of
“commandeering” with effective federalism?197
196. See Jackson, supra note 139, at 597–98 (comparing U.S. and German constitutional
federalism principles in the administration of federal law). Note, too, that executive “comman-
deering” may be subject to different control or influence by affected subnational units in a con-
stitutional system that owes more to the parliamentary model than to the U.S. presidential
model of separation of executive and legislative power. For a discussion of some of these, as
well as other, factors that bear on the relevance of the German experience to whether the
United States should have an anticommandeering rule, see generally Daniel Halberstam, Com-
parative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY
AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Robert
Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis eds., 2001) (arguing that whether commandeering is viewed as
empowering or disempowering the states in a federal system depends on the context, and that
“commandeering” of state officials is less threatening where the national government constitu-
tionally must rely on states to carry out federal law). As has been widely noted, constitutional
courts sometimes refer to foreign constitutional decisions to distinguish them. See, e.g.,
McCrudden, supra note 11, at 512 (stating that the foreign judicial approach can be “influential
in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of domestic law”). Had Justices Scalia and
Breyer engaged in debate on the merits in Printz, a sharpening along these lines might have oc-
curred in analyzing how comparable the two federalisms were. See Jackson, supra note 139, at
584; Halberstam, supra, at 216–17 (“tak[ing] up Justice Breyer’s comparative inquiry” and con-
cluding that Justice Breyer did not consider “countervailing institutional dynamics” in his Printz
dissent).
197. For an explanation of the German constitutional requirements for transfers of tax
revenues to poorer regions from richer regions, see generally Clifford Larsen, States Federal Fi-
nancial, Sovereign and Social. A Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to American Financial Fed-
eralism, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (1999) (arguing that equalization is designed to fulfill the posi-
tive conception of the independence of each state-level, or Land, government by providing the
resources for effective governmental infrastructure); R. St. J. MacDonald, Solidarity in the
Practice and Discourse of Public International Law, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 259 (1996) (describ-
ing equalization provisions as the foundation of the German federal system).
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More generally, does the history leading to the federalist “deal”
or package reflected in the constitution matter? The nation-building
impulses behind the United States Constitution of 1787, as supple-
mented by the universalizing rules of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sev-
enteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, might be
understood to reflect a very different set of goals and concerns than
the German Basic Law, drafted in the wake of the Nazi regime and
explicitly designed to empower and protect the governments of the
Länder (subnational state-level polities). Even if all else were identi-
cal in structure, would the historically different origins of the constitu-
tions suggest that as interpretive issues arose they should be handled
differently? Ackerman, Schuck, and others suggest that there are im-
portant differences between federal systems that are centralizing,
“put together” systems moving toward greater centralization and de-
volutionary, “taking apart” forms of federalism, in which the constitu-
tion is designed to transfer power from the center to the periphery.198
If so, might not both the workings of the overall federal system and
the role of the courts in enforcing that system vary accordingly?
This problem—of determining whether the unit of comparison is
“right,” of whether other features bearing on the “rightness” of the
comparison or the relevance of the particular rule at issue are em-
bedded in the foreign system—is an inescapable challenge. But law-
yers and judges, trained in analogical reasoning both in law schools
and in practice, may be well suited to the task of deciding whether
“the relevant, known similarities give us good reason to believe that
there are further similarities”199 or whether there are relevant differ-
ences that caution against concluding that what works as a rule in one
system will work in another. As Professor Sunstein and many others
agree, “[r]easoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal rea-
soning.”200 Although there are obvious differences between analogical
198. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); Pe-
ter Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. LAW 195 (2000).
199. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 (1993).
200. Id. at 741; see also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2
(1949) (“The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process.”); id. at 4
(noting that the judicial process of law development “requires the presentation of competing
examples”). For other accounts of the role of analogical reasoning in law, see generally Scott
Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal Argument
by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Charles L. Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law
or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical
Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999). Some authors have more skeptical views.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 72–76 (1996) (questioning
the existence of analogical reasoning in law and discussing the views of other critics).
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reasoning constrained by precedent and analogical reasoning about
concededly nonbinding authorities,201 good analogical reasoning’s fo-
cus on particular contexts and on the task of identifying relevant
similarities and differences is likely to be helpful in evaluating
whether another nation’s constitutional decision has any relevance
and hence any persuasive value.202
The comparability problem is ubiquitous, arguably affecting such
individual rights issues as free speech203 or abortion.204 But the ques-
tion of comparability appears particularly difficult in determining the
bearing of comparative constitutional experience on federalism issues
as they arise before courts.
201. Professor Sunstein’s article, for example, may assume that the analogies in legal rea-
soning are generally to other cases with binding value as precedent, so that “judgments about
specific cases must be made consistent with one another” to achieve a “principled consistency”
in result. Sunstein, supra note 199, at 746; cf. supra note 155 (noting that the obligation of con-
sistency may apply only where the same responsible decisionmaking court is involved). But even
when courts are not obligated to achieve a principled consistency with decisions of another
court system (as is usually the case when the courts of one nation consider the constitutional
decisions of another), analogical reasoning skills can be deployed to ask whether the foreign
practice or decision has a close enough fit to be worth considering.
202. Let me be clear that lawyers’ experience with analogical reasoning is by no means a
complete answer to the problems of comparability in constitutional law. Nor, in a setting in
which the lawyer is not constrained to try to reconcile disparate precedents into some mid-level
degree of consistency, is analogical reasoning so readily justified as superior to other forms of
reasoning. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 199, at 770 (assuming that analogical reasoning in law oper-
ates within constraints imposed by existing legal holdings and acceptance of stare decisis). And,
to the extent that anological reasoning in law depends on intuitions honed by deep familiarity
with many cases and contexts, it may be a less acute tool in evaluating foreign material. But my
claim here is only that practice in analogical reasoning (within the setting of a domestic system
in which many “precedents” are “binding”) helps develop skill in discerning arguable similari-
ties and differences that also are necessary in evaluating the degree to which foreign (or other
nonbinding) precedents have value in the decisional process.
203. For example, should the constitutionality of hate speech regulations be analyzed the
same way in the United States as in Germany, in light of Germany’s relatively recent experience
with a regime committed to the systematic destruction of large segments of its own citizenry
chosen on the basis of religion or ethnicity? Cf. The Queen v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 687, 738–
43 (arguing first that U.S. free speech principles might permit punishment of hate speech but
also that U.S. law was distinguishable because of Canada’s distinctive commitments to multicul-
turalism).
204. For example, should the constitutionality of governmental limitations on women’s deci-
sions to terminate pregnancies be affected, at all, by the availability vel non of social support for
pregnancy and child care by the state? Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE
LAW IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 18, 53–58 (1989)
(discussing French social and financial support for mothers); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 211–12 (1992) (disagreeing with Glendon’s approach but examining
the role that social considerations play in abortion decisions).
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D. Constitutional Federalism and the Limits of Comparison
Assume for the moment the utility of consulting foreign constitu-
tional experience, including judicial decisions and reasoning, on ques-
tions of freedom of speech, freedom from torture, or freedom of re-
ligion—questions involving individual rights that widely are viewed as
having some degree of universal character.205 The protection of such
individual rights is widely seen as benefiting from judicial enforce-
ment, and the vibrancy of the transnational constitutional exchange of
ideas on such issues has been well noted.206 The question remains
whether the benefits of considering foreign constitutional decisions
on questions of individual rights being adjudicated under general
commitments to human dignity, liberty, and equality extend to feder-
alism questions. Or is comparative constitutional law less relevant—at
least for lawyers and judges—in the adjudication of doctrinal ques-
tions of federalism than in the adjudication of individual rights issues?
I will suggest that comparative constitutional law may be of less
help in interpreting constitutional terms that allocate power to one or
another level of government than in understanding constitutional
terms that secure certain individual rights.207 That the Supreme Court
205. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, at ix (1990) (describing human rights as
“the idea of our time,” a political idea that has received “universal acceptance,” and discussing,
inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
206. See, e.g., McCrudden, supra note 11, at 449.
207. It may be objected that the dividing line I suggest between structural provisions for
federalism and individual rights provisions is either illusory or an inadequate basis for distinc-
tion as to the relevance of comparative constitutional law. Cf. Steven Calabresi, “A Government
of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
752, 756–90 (1995) (arguing for the equal importance of structural and rights provisions). While
structural provisions may serve individual liberty by, inter alia, preventing tyranny, structural
provisions do so less directly than rights provisions. And while comparative constitutional law
can be helpful across issues of both structure and right in constitutional interpretation, foreign
decisions and discussion of particular issues of allocation of government power are likely to be
less transferable than, for example, decisions and discussion about the nature of freedom of con-
science or freedom of expression. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing Cana-
dian “trade and commerce” power). There are reasons why “universal declarations” of human
rights contain many specific individual rights, lists that are unmatched in their specificity, or in
the consensus with which they are endorsed by the community of nations, by any comparable
universal declarations as to federalism, subsidiarity, or other specific forms of governance (be-
yond commitments to free elections). See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217(A)III, U.N. GAOR, 32 Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (delineating the rights of
the people of all nations with regard to slavery, torture, equality, fair criminal process, freedom
of movement, marriage and family, property ownership, freedom of thought and religion, free-
dom of opinion and assembly, work, rest, and adequate living standards); id. Art. 21 (establish-
ing the right to “take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives” so that the “will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment”); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
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of Canada has construed the Canadian national government’s power
over “trade or commerce” quite narrowly (for example, not to extend
to labeling requirements for products in a single industry) may have
little bearing on the proper scope of the United States Congress’s
power to regulate “interstate and foreign commerce,” in part because
interpretation of the Canadian “trade and commerce” power has
been influenced by the enumerated powers of the Canadian provinces
over property and civil rights,208 an enumeration absent from the
United States Constitution. If even similarly worded “federalism”
provisions call for such different interpretations, the prospects for
transnational understandings of particular federalism terms are thus
quite limited. Other potential benefits of comparative constitutional
study may also be more difficult to glean than in the individual rights
context. Why?
First, federalism provisions of constitutions are often peculiarly
the product of political compromise in historically situated moments,
generally designed as a practical rather than a principled accommoda-
tion of competing interests. Each federal “bargain” is in important re-
spects unique to the parties’ situations, in contrast to constitutional
provisions asserted to guarantee universal, or natural, or necessary
rights of women and men as persons.209 Similar phrases or provisions
concerning federalism may have different historical meanings in a
particular polity, tied in different ways to the political compromises
that are usually at the foundation of a federal union. Second, not only
are federal systems agreed to as a compromise, but the compromise
typically constitutes an interrelated “package” of arrangements.210 No
U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (further specifying individual rights as well as the right of all peoples to “self-
determination”). Although it has been argued that there is an emerging consensus on a “right to
democratic governance,” e.g., Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992), the fact that this proposition is even being debated suggests
how far “universal” understandings are from agreement on more particular governmental struc-
tures such as those involved in federalism. The reasons for the relatively greater specificity
about individual rights than about forms of governance may have to do with the inescapable
ubiquity of human beings as a central concern of any system of governance, as compared to the
variability of the particular forms of political and social organization addressed by constitutions.
208. PETER HOGG, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15.9(b), 20.1, 20.3 (4th ed. 2000).
209. Compare Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D.N.J. 1938) (“[I]n
nearly all modern legal systems we find a right (or liberty) of locomotion (movement) of free
speech (and press) and of free assembly.”), modified and aff’d, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939),
modified and aff’d, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), with L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 180, at 35 (“Deci-
sions on federalism, which are necessarily focused on the particularities of the United States
Constitution [have less influence than decisions] on principles that are more universal . . . .”).
210. This is not to deny that other aspects of constitutional law may be organized as systems
of arrangements as well. Cf. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970) (examining the legal foundations of the system of free expression in the United States).
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one element of the package can be compared to a similar-seeming
element in a different federal system without more broadly consider-
ing the comparability of the whole “package” and the role of the par-
ticular element within that federal package.211 With the current United
States Supreme Court’s doctrinal emphasis on achieving a “balance”
between federal and state power to support structural, nontextual
rules limiting national power, it would seem both particularly impor-
tant, and particularly difficult, to consider the entire package in
evaluating any particular claim. To compare federalism issues, then, it
might be necessary to compare not just decisions on a particular issue
but also the entire interrelated structure of a foreign federal system—
a task that is even more difficult, especially for judges and lawyers in
adjudication.212
Although particular constitutional terms and issues may, then, be
too contingently located in a specific nation’s federalism for transna-
tional understandings of those terms to emerge, detailed comparative
study may permit identification of principles of governance, or of in-
terpretations, of more general application. And there are ways in
which judges’ interpretive understandings of U.S. federalism issues
could benefit from looking to the constitutional experiences of other
nations—including constitutional practices, judicial decisions on con-
stitutional issues, and judicial reasoning about constitutional law.213
But it is the bargained for, contingently dependent relationship of the elements of federal sys-
tems (or possibly of separation of powers arrangements) that seems distinctive from the possible
development of systemic sets of principles, as sometimes emerge in the area of speech and asso-
ciational rights. Cf. Roger Errera, The Freedom of the Press: The United States, France and
Other European Countries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 63–70, 83–86 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds., 1990) (arguing that the United States has a constitutional system of freedom of expression
in a way that France does not).
211. Note that the role of courts in enforcing the structures of federalism may be set up
quite differently from one system to the next; a judicial review system that extends standing to a
minority of subnational unit governments might be thought to invite more aggressive policing,
on behalf of the subnational units, of the boundaries of power of the national government. See
Art. 93(1)2 GG, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(GERMANY), supra note 153, at 149 (extending the jurisdiction of the German federal constitu-
tional court [Bundesverfassungsgericht] to challenges to constitutionality of federal or Land law
brought by a Land government). Others may significantly limit governmental standing while
incorporating other kinds of strong protections for subnational governments (such as equal suf-
frage for unequally sized units in the national legislature). While these are aspects of the pack-
age nature of federalism issues, they might be seen as particularly relevant to what courts do.
212. A key question is whether the systems are comparable: Have the federalisms formed to
serve similar purposes? What is the package of structures that have been designed to secure
federal goals?
213. For a discussion of these three categories of constitutional experiences, see supra notes
135–37 and accompanying text. Knowledge of other countries’ constitutional practices may be
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While Professor Tushnet identifies several possible ways to un-
derstand comparative constitutional study,214 I want to focus on a
more diffuse, but nonetheless helpful category—the “stance” of re-
viewing courts to federalism-based claims about national power in the
United States. Comparative study might have a moderating effect on
U.S. federalism discussions. As Part I above has shown, predictions of
dire consequences if the Court fails to limit national powers on behalf
of the states have, from time to time, reached a fevered pitch.215 A
calmer, more moderate stance might ensue if judges were more aware
of how broad the powers are that states in the United States continue
to exercise, especially in the realm of taxation and finance, when
compared to those of subnational units in other western federal de-
mocracies.216 On the other hand, some argue that federalism in the
United States is a nonfunctional vestige of the past that should influ-
ence neither statutory interpretation nor constitutional decisionmak-
ing.217 Such arguments, however, overlook the possible benefits of ju-
dicial doctrine that at least holds open the prospect of enforcing
federalism-based limits against efforts dangerously to centralize
power at the national level (perhaps not to be expected but theoreti-
cally possible). A knowledge that in Nazi Germany abolition of the
self-governing capacities of the Länder was a prelude to the extermi-
nation of large parts of the population and that the German constitu-
tion now guarantees as unamendable that Germany will remain a
federal state, might well be relevant, for example, should a claim arise
as important as knowledge of the reasoning and result of constitutional court decisions. This
knowledge, for one thing, would illustrate the diversity of constitutional practices that have sup-
ported vibrant federal systems, and thus help form basic attitudes courts bring to the task of
evaluating the constitutionality of their own countries’ legislation even if they are of less value
in resolving specific interpretive problems. But cf. Fontana, supra note 188 (manuscript at 3 n.4)
(suggesting that judges should focus on legal texts rather than entire systems).
214. Mark Tushnet, supra note 160, at 1269–1306 (discussing “functionalism,” “expressiv-
ism,” and “bricolage”). As noted above, Professor Tushnet argues that comparative constitu-
tional law may help identify better ways of addressing common problems, including federalism
problems. This “functional” approach, Tushnet explains, entails the assumption that constitu-
tional systems face similar problems and have government entities that must perform similar
functions, and that there may be doctrines in other constitutional systems that represent better
accommodations. Id. at 1238. In an earlier article, I argue along functional lines that the Cana-
dian doctrine of proportionality could play a role in U.S. constitutional law. Jackson, supra note
139, at 602–34. Below, in Section E of this Part, I discuss the German concept of Bundestreue.
215. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 197, at 438; Paul Bernd Spahn & Wolfgang F`ttinger,
Germany, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 228–30 (Teresa Ter-Minassian
ed., 1997) (describing the circumscribed authority of Länder governments over taxation).
217. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907–09 (1994).
JACKSON.DOC 12/21/01 2:40 PM
276 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:223
that an emergency requires the national government to replace or
take over state governments.218 Having a sense of perspective born of
greater knowledge of the ways in which federal governments are con-
stituted, preserved, and succeed or fail elsewhere may be important to
informing the fundamental attitude that judges bring to federalism
problems.219
Comparative constitutional study may bear on the Court’s stance
in reviewing federalism challenges to legislation in another way as
well. Understanding foreign constitutional systems would entail
knowledge of the procedures used to amend foreign constitutions,
thus emphasizing how much more difficult it is to change the U.S.
Constitution through formal amendment than to change the constitu-
tions of many other countries, including such strongly federal nations
as Germany.220 While judicial review is quite commonly described in
218. Cf. Gordon Hahn, Putin’s “Federal Revolution”: The Administrative and Judicial Re-
form of Russian Federalism, 10 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 1, 64 (2001) (describing how, in Russia,
President Putin recently procured enactment of a law authorizing the removal from office of a
governor of a republic who fails within six months to address constitutional violations in the re-
public).
219. For an example of how a judicial stance on structural separation of powers issues may
be influenced by knowledge of developments elsewhere, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
It is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic tra-
ditions of the Mississippi Valley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come in
a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disre-
gard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of author-
ity.
220. The German Basic Law prohibits amendments that “affect[] the division of the Federa-
tion into Länder, their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Ar-
ticles 1 [human dignity] and 20 [establishing the right to resist any person seeking to abolish the
constitutional order].” Art. 79 ¶ 3 GG, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (GERMANY), supra note 153, at 139. Apart from such prohibited amendments, the
Basic Law can be amended only by a law expressly modifying its text, which must be passed by
two-thirds of the Members of the Bundestag (the popularly elected house) and two-thirds of the
votes of the Bundesrat (which represents the Länder governments). Art. 79 ¶ 2 GG, translated
in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (GERMANY), supra note 153, at 139.
The votes of the Länder in the Bundesrat are not determined on the basis of equality that pre-
vails in the United States Senate, but bear some, though not exact, relation to the population
size of the Land. See Art. 51 ¶ 2 GG, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (GERMANY), supra note 153, at 126 (each Land has at least three votes; Land with
population over two million get four votes; over six million get five votes; and with over seven
million get six votes). Altogether there are sixty-nine votes in the Bundesrat. Stimmenverteilung,
Bundesrat, at http://www.bundesrat.de/aktuell/Stimmen.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2001) [here-
inafter Stimmenverteilung] (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Together the seven smallest
Länder have twenty-four votes in the Bundesrat, STATISCHES BUNDESAMT (FEDERAL
STATISTICAL OFFICE), STATISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 45
tbl. 3.2 (2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Stimmenverteilung, supra, which is the
amount needed to block an amendment, see § 79 ¶ 2 GG, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF
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the United States as “countermajoritarian,” the U.S. amendment pro-
cess is in a sense also deeply “countermajoritarian” in the degree to
which it allows small minorities of persons to prevent formal constitu-
tional amendment.221 Given this difficulty in the formal amendment
process, some degree of evolutionary potential allowing for “play in
the joints” probably has been necessary to allow this Constitution to
continue to provide a framework for governance.222 Awareness of the
greater power of its own decisions to forestall majoritarian decision-
making (relative to other constitutional courts) because of the un-
usual difficulty of formal amendment might lead the Court to re-
evaluate the degree to which it defers to national legislative decisions
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (GERMANY), supra note 153, at 139. These seven Länder in-
clude 15.7% of the German population. STATISCHES BUNDESRAT, supra, at 45 tbl. 3.2.
In the United States, the smallest seventeen states (whose thirty-four votes in the Sen-
ate can block passage of a proposed amendment) represent 7.3% of the total U.S. population,
while the smallest thirteen states (one more than one-fourth of the states, three-fourths of which
must approve an amendment) contain only 4.5% of the total population. Census 2000 PHC-T2.
Ranking Tables for States: 1990 and 2000: Table 1: States Ranked by Population: 2000, U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-ts/tab01.pdf (last visited Aug. 26,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Under Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, different procedures for amendment apply to
different kinds of changes; with respect to some changes particularly affecting the provinces, the
consent of an affected province is required. Compare Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, § 43 (Can.)
(stating that no amendment that applies to less than all provinces, including alteration of their
boundaries or use of English or French languages, can be made without authorization of the
legislature of each affected province), with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (formation of a new state
from parts of or through joinder of existing states requires the consent of the affected states’
legislatures), and id. art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suf-
frage in the Senate.”). The default rule in Canada is that amendments require a resolution in the
national parliament, approved by at least two-thirds of the provinces with at least one-half the
population, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, § 38(1) (Can.); HOGG, supra note 208, § 4.3(a), a
somewhat less rigorous rule than that of the United States, which requires the approval of three-
fourths of the states, U.S. CONST. art. V.
221. See supra note 220. For an analysis of the disproportionalities in Congress resulting
from the allocation of equal voting power to each state in the Senate, and the difficulties of us-
ing amendment to redress the problem, see generally Lynn Baker, Federalism: The Argument
from Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923 (1997); Lynn Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate:
An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 (1997). Cf. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 410 (1998) (arguing in favor of popular referenda, repeated
at two sequential presidential elections, to approve constitutional amendments). Ackerman pre-
sumably favors requiring repeat approvals over time rather than supermajority voting because
the latter allows minorities too much power to block change. Id. (noting that under his proposed
national referenda each citizen’s vote would have the same weight).
222. See John Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 272 & n.54
(2000) (noting the importance of the Constitution’s capacity for internal growth and change in
constitutional law).
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in its constitutional analyses where those decisions are challenged
only on federalism grounds.223
So ultimately my claim for the benefit of comparative constitu-
tional learning for judges, on federalism issues likely to come before
them, is a modest one: more comparative knowledge can provide a
broader and deeper perspective on the role of courts in enforcing
federalism limits within federal systems. These perspectives in turn
may affect the degree of scrutiny or deference judges bring to re-
viewing actions of the national legislature. But I also would urge that
there is some harm from ignorance. It is no longer possible to func-
tion in the world, as lawyers or as courts, without some knowledge of
how other constitutional systems operate.224 We have, or think we
have, knowledge of how other systems operate. This knowledge in-
fluences thinking about our own system in ways that we may not, but
should attempt to, recognize.225 Claims about the distinctiveness of the
223. The countermajoritarian character of the amending process is relevant to the Court’s
stance on any constitutional question for which its ruling is treated as final (i.e., not dormant
Commerce Clause cases), since the difficulty of amending applies to any such decision. But the
observation has special force in federalism cases because, although I do not agree that federal-
ism claims should be unreviewable, I do agree with Professor Wechsler’s observation that there
is less need for judicial policing of Congress’s work on federalism grounds given the representa-
tive structure of the Congress as including persons elected from geographic districts defined by
and within the boundaries of each state. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954); see also William Cohen, Congressional Power to
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 613–16 (1975) (invoking
Wechsler’s argument in support of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). For an argu-
ment that the Framers assigned no significant role to the courts in enforcing federalism limits on
national power and that political parties function across state and federal lines to protect state
interests, see generally Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). Professor Baker has powerfully argued, see supra
note 221, and argues again in this conference with Professor Young, Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 117–21 (2001),
that distortions in representation in the national political process are likely to produce undesir-
able national legislation because representatives from the overrepresented (smaller) states can
and will externalize costs to the underrepresented (larger) states and that overall welfare would
be improved by allowing different states to reach different decisions on morally contentious
problems. But I am unconvinced either (1) that more aggressive judicial review of national leg-
islation on federalism grounds will effectively target less desirable as opposed to more desirable
legislation or (2) that the divisiveness of an issue seen as one of morality correlates in a constitu-
tionally coherent way with a plausible fixed boundary between national and state legislative
competence.
224. In contrast to the first 150 years of decisions by the Supreme Court, when there were
very few other nations with written constitutions subject to judicial enforcement by courts
whose decisions were available in and reported in English, there are now many such systems.
225. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 172–73, 176
(1921) (suggesting that a spirit of self-searching can help judges render judgment free from “un-
conscious prejudices”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 114, 362 (6th ed. 1949)
(arguing that stimulating judges to attain greater awareness of the factors that influence their
judgments will enable “sound intelligence to play a larger part in the process of judging”).
JACKSON.DOC 12/21/01 2:40 PM
2001] NARRATIVES OF FEDERALISM 279
United States’s system, moreover, have again become important in
the narrative of the Court. Claims of distinctiveness always imply an
“other” with which implicit comparison is invited. Given the inevita-
bility of these implicit comparisons, decisionmakers should try to as-
sure themselves that their sense of what makes the United States
unique, or of what it shares with other “civilized” governments, is ac-
curate—regardless of whether other systems or other courts’ deci-
sions are cited. Incorrectly assuming that there is a single answer to
structural problems that instead may have several useable approaches
diminishes the quality of decisionmaking.
E. U.S. Federalism, Judicial Review of Federal Laws and
Bundestreue
Recent doctrinal ferment over federalism in the United States
underscores the importance of understanding divergent approaches
to assuring the vibrancy of a federal nation. As I hope briefly to illus-
trate, revisiting our own constitutional traditions, as well as under-
standing those of other federal nations, can illuminate alternative ap-
proaches that may be better suited to judicial enforcement than much
of the Court’s current approach.
By way of background, I should say that, in contrast to some
other contributors to this symposium,226 I believe that the continued
vibrancy of state governments in U.S. federalism rests primarily on
the political structures created or recognized by the Constitution—
voting for national office by districts that do not cross state
boundaries; regular elections at different intervals for the House, the
Senate, and the Presidency, selecting officeholders who exercise
federal lawmaking and executive powers; independent state elections
of state government officials; and fixed state boundaries. History
demonstrates that the national political process can work in two
directions—to consolidate national power and to devolve power to
the states. The more rapid growth in state and local government
employment relative to federal employment in recent decades
counsels skepticism of claims that the federal government is
squeezing out state and local governments from innovation and ac-
226. See Baker & Young, supra note 223, at 106–33 (arguing that political safeguards do not
sufficiently protect states’ rights); see also Ann Althouse, Why Talking About “States’ Rights”
Cannot Avoid the Need for Normative Federalism Analysis: A Response to Professors Baker and
Young, 51 DUKE L.J. 363, 370–73 (2001) (arguing that few “seriously believe” that political
checks safeguard federalism, but urging that the question of whether states would use increased
autonomy to good ends remains to be answered).
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tivism.227 Political processes grounded in constitutional structure have
worked in important respects to balance and give expression to the
interests of the states and the people of the states in the national leg-
islature.228 Moreover, the Court’s record of activism on behalf of the
states as against national power is neither impressive nor durable.
While it is easy to mock “congressional federalism,”229 it is also easy to
forget the untenable positions in which the Court has placed itself in
the past when it has resisted reasoned exercises of national power on
behalf of the states.230 Federal systems, moreover, reveal a wide varia-
tion in the amount and nature of lawmaking authority reserved to
subnational units,231 adding to the difficulty of attempting to define,
without a textual anchor (apart from the “tautological” provisions of
227. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 487–88 (1997) (arguing that state governmental powers were expanded
by New Deal doctrine at the same time as federal government powers expanded); Vicki C. Jack-
son, Couer d’Alene, Federal Courts and the Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Para-
digms of Chief Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 301, 303 n.12 (1998) (de-
tailing a greater absolute and percentage increase in state government employment than in
federal government employment between 1972 and the 1990s).
228. State governments sometimes receive treatment under federal statutes that is compa-
rable to the treatment afforded to the federal government by the same statutes. Such statutes
may provide exemptions or immunities in ways that suggest that the national political process is
attentive to the position of the states as constitutionally guaranteed governments. For example,
even before the overtime amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that were
prompted by responses to Garcia, the FLSA contained exemptions for certain positions in state
government roughly analogous to exemptions for certain federal employees. Compare, e.g., Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 59 (1974) (de-
fining which employees of the federal government are covered so as to exclude certain employ-
ees of Congress, and the federal courts [that is, those not in a “unit . . . which has positions in the
competitive service”], or in the Office of the President [that is, those not in an “executive
agency” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 105]), with id. (defining covered employees of state or local
governments to exclude persons not subject to state civil service laws and holding public elective
office, or selected by an elected official as a member of his staff or appointed to serve the of-
ficeholder on a policymaking level, a definition excluding, for example, most state court judges).
See also Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(5), 11, 86 Stat.
103, 103, 111 (1972) (amending Title VII to extend its application to certain federal and state
employees but specifically excluding certain government employees both in state legislatures
and the Congress).
229. For an early use of the term “congressional federalism,” see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., supra note 4 (noting Knight’s distinction between manufacturing and com-
merce, a distinction since abandoned).
231. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (implying that family law and
crime are for the states and not the federal government to regulate), with Constitution Act,
1867, § 91 (Can.) (enumerating criminal law and laws relating to marriage and divorce as powers
of the national government in Canada); Art. 74 Nrs. 1, 2, 18, 26 GG, translated in 7
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (GERMANY), supra note 153, at 134–36 &
9 (Supp. 1995) (establishing concurrent jurisdiction in Germany over the registration of births,
deaths and marriages, over real property transactions, and over artificial insemination of hu-
mans).
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the Tenth Amendment), particular substantive areas that are cate-
gorically outside federal power in the United States.
Although these and other factors favor a deferential judicial
stance toward review of national legislation challenged on federalism
grounds, the Court’s simply renouncing the field also would pose
dangers.232 First, states are not just like private businesses in the con-
stitutional scheme. They are required to exist; their existence is neces-
sary for each change in the composition of the federal government
every two years, and there is thus a constitutional interest in assuring
that states are not destroyed, eliminated, or prevented from func-
tioning by, for example, bankruptcy. Second, states not only are as-
sumed to exist, but are assumed to exist in particular form, exercising
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. These constitutional guide-
posts are clear and should be judicially enforceable if national action
were to threaten the existence of these functions—which, given the
political process, it is unlikely to do. Judicial renunciation of contin-
ued review of federalism cases, moreover, is likely to be destabilizing;
telling any political body that its power vis-à-vis another political
body is legally unchecked is not conducive to responsible action. Ad-
ditionally, eliminating the possibility of judicial review heightens the
stakes for loser states in the national political process.
To what, then, can we look to help better define the judicial role
in responding to federalism-based challenges to national power? I of-
fer two suggestions: first, to reconsider what is available within our
own constitutional traditions to preserve Congress’s legitimate use of
national power while affording appropriate protection to the con-
tinuing status of the states in the federal union; and second, to under-
stand more about U.S. federalism by learning from the experiences of
other federal nations.
For reasons well rehearsed in the literature, there are many po-
litical pressures in Congress that can submerge state interests. Clear
statement rules, presumptions against intrusion on traditional areas of
state authority, and the like, however, can be useful mechanisms to
assure that the theory of legislative deliberation of state interests in
Congress has some chance to work, without imposing rigid judicial
barriers to evolving understandings of what is “truly national.”233 In
232. For a more extended discussion, see Jackson, supra note 9, at 2223–28 (discussing the
rule of law and cued deliberation).
233. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”); see LEVI, supra note 200, at
41–72 (arguing that constitutional interpretation will have less consistency than statutory or
JACKSON.DOC 12/21/01 2:40 PM
282 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:223
addition, the anticommandering rule’s exception for “generally appli-
cable” laws that can constitutionally apply to the states234 has the pro-
cedural effect of linking states’ interest in avoiding burdensome fed-
eral legislation with that of private entities, a device that enhances the
likelihood that undue burdens on states in federal legislation will be
ironed out in the legislative process. I have elsewhere suggested that a
law that is “generally applicable” to private entities and states might
still make it too difficult for some states to sustain their uniquely gov-
ernmental constitutional functions, and that further protection of
state interests arises where the law in question is extended to the fed-
eral, as well as state governments (or there are legitimate reasons
Congress considered for different treatment of state and federal gov-
ernments).235 A presumption in favor of the constitutionality (as
against federalism challenges) of federal statutes that are generally
applicable not only to private entities but also to the federal as well as
state governments, would be a mechanism to yoke the federal gov-
ernment’s self-interest as a government to the preservation of the
states as governments.236
common law development because the meanings of the Constitution’s ambiguous words neces-
sarily change in response to what the “community” comes to accept); see also Judith Resnik,
Categorical Federalism, 111 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2001) (manuscript at 5, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the Court’s effort categorically to declare family and gender
matters solely of state concern is inconsistent with the development of federal law in many
areas).
234. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a
federal law requiring states to take measures to protect the privacy of driver’s license informa-
tion because the law did not require the state to regulate third parties and was one of general
application, and thus outside the scope of the anticommandeering rule); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (distinguishing Garcia as involving a law of general applicabil-
ity).
235. See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 1006–09
(2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the Denation-
alization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 732–38 (2000). Where Congress subjects states
to a remedy from which it exempts itself, it might be appropriate for the Court to at least con-
sider whether the reasons for exempting the federal government also might be applicable to the
states in evaluating whether the law threatens performance of the states’ constitutional func-
tions. The debate between majority and dissent in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), over whether the Patent Act’s
remedies as against the federal government were or were not similar to those as against the
states, id. at 648 n.11; id. at 663 & n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting), can be understood in these
terms.
236. Such an inquiry also might be one that courts can manage, at least in its initial stages,
more readily than evaluating the effects of legislation in particular subject areas on a federal-
state “balance” that consists of many elements. See supra notes 71, 209–12 and accompanying
text. Yet my suggested approach also would raise a number of questions that may not be easy to
answer. What counts as comparable treatment (e.g., are administrative penalties against a fed-
eral agency similar to judicial penalties against a state)? What is a good reason for different
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Consider the bearing, now, of what might be viewed as an indi-
genously American analogue to the German constitutional doctrine
of Bundestreue, a notion of “pro-federal” loyalty or comity.237 In 1870,
the United States Supreme Court in Collector v. Day238 held unconsti-
tutional the application of a federal tax to the salaries of state offi-
cials, a decision not reversed until well into the twentieth century.239 In
his dissent to Collector v. Day, Justice Bradley argued that the federal
government “has the same power of taxing the income of officers of
the State governments as it has of taxing that of its own officers.”240
His reasoning focused on the fact that the federal government acted
for all and that officials of the states also were United States citizens.
But his linkage of federal power to tax a state’s officers to its power to
tax its own officers is of note. It resonates with the Court’s reserva-
tion in McCulloch v. Maryland of the question whether its decision,
prohibiting a state from directing a tax against the National Bank,
would “extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in com-
mon with the other real property within the state.”241
What these statements suggest is the value of judicial focus on
whether state or national regulations or taxes discriminate against the
other level of government.242 This antidiscrimination principle would
require a close look at burdens imposed by the federal government
on states but not on the federal government’s own comparable activi-
treatment of federal as opposed to state governments that could mitigate concern over the ad-
verse effects on state governments of laws from which the federal government is exempt? How,
in the presence of differential treatment of federal and state governments, should the Court
evaluate states’ constitutional objections to federal requirements? These and other questions
might in the end prove this proposal too uncertain a tool. For a critique along these lines, see
Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1340 n.35 (2001).
237. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 71 (2d ed. 1997) (translating Television I, 12 BverfG 205 (1961)). For
helpful general discussions of the concept of Bundestreue, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 77–80 (1994) (defining Bundestreue
as “a duty of fidelity to the principle of federalism,” a “constitutional analog of the general civil-
law duty of an obligator to act in good faith”); KOMMERS, supra, at 69–75 (defining Bundestreue
as a “principle of federal comity”); see also infra notes 244–47 and accompanying text.
238. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
239. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939).
240. 78 U.S. at 128 (Bradley, J., dissenting)
241. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
242. An antidiscrimination rule is well developed in the case law on state taxation of federal
activities or employees. See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 427 (1999) (upholding
the imposition of a county tax on the income of federal judges where, inter alia, the tax also ap-
plied to state and county judges); Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989) (holding unconsti-
tutional a state law distinguishing between federal and state government sources of retirement
income in providing exemptions from state income tax).
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ties. This principle, however, would accord substantial deference to
national legislation that is evenhanded in how it falls on the activities
of constitutional sovereigns. An “antidiscrimination” presumption
would help prevent the national government from directing laws at
the states in a fashion designed to hobble them, competitively, vis-à-
vis the federal government, and may be more likely to assure that the
political process has given attention to whether the federal rule is
compatible with the exercise of state sovereign functions.243 It also
might usefully screen out action by either level of government that is
motivated by hostility or indifference to the constitutional position of
the other.
Now let us return to the German concept of Bundestreue. As
Professor Donald Kommers translates Bundestreue, it is a “principle
of federal comity . . . which obligates federal and state governments to
consider each other’s interests in exercising their authority.”244 This
concept of “pro-federal comity” imposes obligations that run in three
directions—from central government to the subnational governments;
from the subnational governments to the central government; and
presumably among the subnational governments. Bundestreue was
treated as requiring a cooperative spirit of consultation in the Televi-
sion Cases, which, Kommers describes, grew out of an effort by the
German federal government to create a television station in competi-
tion with a television station that was controlled by the governments
of the Länder.245 The federal government was found to have “violated
the obligation to act profederally” when it failed appropriately to
consult with the Länder concerning the plan it had drafted.246 The
243. This principle will not remedy the problem that Baker and Young identify of some
states seeking to impose preferences about morally contentious issues on other states through
national legislation. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1940 (1995); Baker & Young, supra note 223, at 117–24. Query, though, how the
Court’s current doctrine of Lopez and Morrison would distinguish between those national stat-
utes that Baker and Young condemn from those they would permit. And query how the Court
would use the Commerce Clause doctrines to determine what issues are “morally contentious”
but outside federal power from those that are “morally contentious” but within federal power.
Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1917) (holding unconstitutional a prohibi-
tion on the interstate shipment of goods made by children), with United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 117 (1941) (overruling Hammer).
244. KOMMERS, supra note 237, at 69.
245. Id. at 69–70.
246. Id. at 74–75. It is not entirely clear that Bundestreue was necessarily dispositive in this
case. The Chancellor promulgated a regulation by decree without consulting fully with all of the
Länder. Id. at 70, 73. Notwithstanding a specific constitutional grant of power to the federal
government over “postal and telecommunication services,” the Court treated the reservation to
the Länder of power over “cultural affairs” as a constraint on national power. Id. at 70–71. On
JACKSON.DOC 12/21/01 2:40 PM
2001] NARRATIVES OF FEDERALISM 285
Court specifically held that the principle of pro-federal behavior
“governs the procedure and style of the negotiations required in con-
stitutional life between the federation and its members.”247
Is the idea of pro-federal loyalty relevant to the United States?
First, as Mark Tushnet has also noted, Justice Cardozo’s famous as-
sertion that “‘the peoples of the several states must sink or swim to-
gether’” in explanation of the dormant Commerce Clause “resonates
with the idea of Bundestreue.”248 Moreover, concerns similar to those
expressed in the German cases on Bundestreue support the “clear
statement” rules the United States Supreme Court has developed for
interpreting federal legislation particularly affecting state interests.249
Such rules provide notice to states that their interests may be affected
and thus afford opportunities for states to articulate concerns or ob-
jections in efforts to influence the national political process. In this re-
spect, moreover, clear statement rules generate the possibilities for
advance consultations with states that in Canada and Germany are
considered an important feature of the constitutional process.250
On the other hand, to require the consultative aspects of Bunde-
streue (or of “executive federalism” as it has been practiced in Can-
ada through regular meetings of ministers of the provinces)251 would
be less workable in the United States. Not only are there a far greater
number of states with which to consult, but the persistence of the
“separation of powers” model of organization at the state level means
that—in contrast to parliamentary-type systems—state executives
this basis alone the case could seemingly have been decided. In a later case described by Kom-
mers, the German Constitutional Court held that it violated Bundestreue for a Land government
to allow a locality to conduct referenda on atomic weapons, a subject committed to the central
government. Id. at 77–78. More recently, in 1995, Kommers reports, the Court upheld European
Community regulations to which the federal government had agreed but found a violation of
the principle of comity in the failure to consult with the states. Id. at 74–75.
247. Id. at 72.
248. Mark Tushnet, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 880 (1996) (quoting
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)). For a possibly related suggestion that
unanimity of state agreement should be relevant to the constitutionality of federal action, see
Justice White’s dissent in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 196 (1992) (White, J., dis-
senting).
249. See Tushnet, supra note 248, at 880.
250. For a thoughtful discussion of the constitutional obligation of the national and provin-
cial governments to negotiate in the event of a referendum vote favoring secession in Quebec,
see Reference re the Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2. S.C.R. 217, 265–96.
251. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 50 (2d ed. 1994); HOGG,
supra note 208, § 5.8.
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with whom consultations might most easily occur cannot necessarily
commit their states to particular policies.252
The concept of Bundestreue may be linked to the antidiscrimina-
tion principle suggested in McCulloch and Davis v. Michigan (with
respect to state behavior toward the national government) and which
Justice Bradley may have been intuiting in his dissent in Collector v.
Day with respect to federal treatment of the states, as well as to the
Court’s occasional references to the application (vel non) to federal
activities of national laws challenged on federalism grounds.253 States
cannot act in a manner hostile to federal interests, though states
might be able to extend generally applicable laws to federal interests.
Rather than relying on broad, atextual principles of state immunity,254
a presumption that remedial schemes (under otherwise valid, gener-
ally applicable federal laws that extend to activities engaged in by
states) are permissible, provided that they fall evenhandedly on com-
parable federal activities, would help assure that federal legislation is
not motivated by hostility or indifference to the states’ governmental
interests and thus would be consistent with the duties owed by the
governing parts of a federal system to the whole. Whether this sugges-
tion could contribute to useable doctrine today is a question I con-
tinue to think is worth asking.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has manifested concern about
its own role, its own precedents, and the respect due them. What this
bodes for federalism doctrine and for the Court’s openness to com-
parative constitutional learning, however, is no easy matter to predict.
For scholars and critics of the Court, comparative constitutional expe-
rience reveals the importance of a sense of shared endeavor and the
danger of establishing permanent enemies within the polity, as op-
posed to “opposition” that can hope to triumph in the next election or
in the next case.
252. See HOGG, supra note 208, § 5.8 .
253. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 n.11 (“[C]ontrary to the dissent’s intimation, . . .
the Patent Remedy Act does not put states in the same position as the United States.”); id. at
663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Patent Remedy Act puts states in “in virtually the
same posture as the United States”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 510, 526–27 (1988)
(noting, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to federal conditions on tax-free bond interest as
applied to state-issued bonds, that the same requirements extended to “bonds issued by the
United States,” as well as bonds issued by private corporations).
254. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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One function of constitutions is to create space for interpretive
contest, in which dissent plays an important role, and which hold
open to “losers” of constitutional contests the possibility of a win at
some future time. Dissenters should not be regarded as enemies. Fed-
eralism in the United States never died, and thus its revival, though
important, is not as dramatic a departure as some would have it.
Comparative constitutional study, though of limited use in resolving
specific federalism issues, may be of substantial value in providing a
more balanced framework and perspective for evaluating as well as in
suggesting interpretive approaches that may be helpful in resolving
constitutional problems in the United States.255
255. For another possible example, see Jackson, supra note 6, at 1299–1301 (discussing a
Canadian court’s reliance on the gender-equality provisions of the later-enacted Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to explain the need for a generous interpretation of the federal
“criminal law power” in resolving a federalism challenge to a national gun registration law).
